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NOTE
REDEFINING THE LEGAL FAMILY:
PROTECTING THE RIGHTS OF COPARENTS AND
THE BEST INTERESTS OF THEIR CHILDREN
I. INTRODUCTION

What makes a family? Perhaps biological relation determines
family. But, are two parents and their adopted child a family? Surely, the
answer to this inquiry shows that family is not necessarily based on
biology. Perhaps, then, an interactive, loving, caretaking relationship
between parents and children makes a family. However, if a person were
separated at birth from his or her biological parents only to be reunited
with them later in life, would anyone deny that those individuals were
family? Certainly, no one would.
This, of course, is a trick question. There is no easy answer. Indeed,
the concept of "family" is something we all simply accept during the
course of our daily lives. A family is a family because they act like a
family. Mothers, fathers, and children make families. But what happens
when the parents separate and begin individual lives? Does the adults'
decision to end their relationship terminate their roles as parents? Do the
separate lives that the parents begin cause the children to no longer be
their children? The answer seems clear: of course not.
But, the law often leads to that exact result when a relationship ends
between two same-sex coparents.' Despite the coparents' intent to
1. I am acutely aware of the sensitivity surrounding the terminology used throughout this
Note. I prefer to use the term "coparent" to refer to a nonbiological and frequently nonadoptive
parent who planned with his or her partner to have a child who is biologically related to the partner.
I prefer to use the term "legal parent" to describe the biological parent because I feel that the
concentration on biological connection is inappropriate. However, at times I am forced to use
terminology relating biological relation for the sake of clarity. Also, I often use "coparents" to
describe the parenting pair, which should be clear in context. Additionally, I prefer the term
"nontraditional" to "alternative." Whatever the terms, I do not intend to be discriminatory,
dismissive, or diminutive to anyone at any time. It is also important to recognize that I believe that
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conceive and raise a child together, and despite long-standing, nurturing,
supporting, and loving parental roles, a same-sex coparent is often a
third party in the eyes of the law.2 Because of a lack of biological
connection, a coparent becomes a nonparent and, thus, a stranger. The
child is no longer his or her child. The legal parent's fundamental rights
easily trump all claims that the coparent may have as a mere third party
to the coparent-child relationship.4 The child, having known the coparent
as his or her parent for his or her whole life, has no protected
relationship with the coparent.
However, as "a mosaic of modem living arrangements has
displaced the nuclear family as the predominant American form,"5 many
states have attempted to soothe these inequities by acknowledging the
validity of the bond between a same-sex coparent and his or her child.
To protect that bond, and thereby protect the best interests of the child
by ensuring the continuance of a healthy parental relationship, courts
and legislatures have used several methods to allow a same-sex coparent
to assert varying degrees of parental rights over his or her former
partner's biological child, whom both parties wanted and planned to
raise together.6 Those methods include second parent adoption and
private ordering mechanisms called coparenting agreements.7 Also,
courts have employed de facto parenthood, in loco parentis, and
equitable estoppel doctrines to determine that a coparent is a parent in
the context of a legal dispute.8 Additionally, some legislatures have
enacted same-sex marriage and other statutory relationships, such as
the arguments put forward in this Note are equally applicable to gay parenting couples and lesbian
parenting couples.
2. See, e.g., Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27, 28 (N.Y. 1991); see infra notes 240-46
and accompanying text (discussing the standard for standing established in Alison D.).
3. See, e.g., Alison D., 572 N.E.2d at 28; see discussion infra Part IIl.A (discussing Alison D.
and other cases that treat coparents as third parties to the parent-child relationship).
4. See, e.g., Ronald FF. v. Cindy GG., 511 N.E.2d 75, 77 (N.Y. 1987); see discussion infra
Part ILI.A (discussing Ronald FF.and other cases which hold that coparents may not interfere with
the legal parent-child relationship).
5. Craig W. Christensen, Legal Orderingof Family Values: The Case of Gay and Lesbian
Families, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1299, 1316 (1997).
6. See discussion infra Part II (discussing in detail second parent adoption, coparenting
agreements, judicial remedies, and legislative solutions).
7. See, e.g., Margaret S. Osborne, Note, Legalizing Families: Solutions to Adjudicate
Parentagefor Lesbian Co-Parents,49 VILL. L. REv. 363, 368-71 (2004); see discussion infra Parts
IL.A-B, III.B. 1-2 (explaining second parent adoption and coparenting agreements).
8. See, e.g., Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood
to Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other NontraditionalFamilies, 78 GEO. L.J.
459, 491-92 (1990) (discussing equitable estoppel); Osborne, supranote 7, at 378, 382 (defining de
facto parenthood and in loco parentis, respectively); see discussion infra Parts lI.C, Ill.B.3-4
(reviewing the judicial remedies of de facto parenthood, in loco parentis,and equitable estoppel).
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civil unions and domestic partnerships, which can serve to formalize the
relationship both between the adults and between the coparent and the
child.9 Finally, all legislatures have enacted some variation of a third
party statute, which entitles a nonparent to bring suit regarding the
custody or visitation of a child.' 0
Like other states, New York seeks to protect and foster the
continuation of healthy parent-child relationships in order to serve a
child's best interests after the dissolution of his or her parents'
relationship." However, if that child's parents are of the same sex, the
law does not provide the same protection and encouragement to the
coparent-child relationship as it does to the child of opposite-sex
parents. 12 In fact, in the absence of a second-parent adoption or an
argument of equitable estoppel after a determination that the coparent
stands in loco parentis to the child, a coparent-child relationship may not
be legally acknowledged, let alone protected, by the state.13 Therefore,
New York State must recognize and protect nontraditional families
through each possible mechanism, including second-parent adoption,
9. See Deborah L. Forman, Same-Sex Partners:Strangers, Third Parties, or Parents? The
Changing Legal Landscape and the Strugglefor ParentalEquality, 40 FAM. L.Q. 23, 44-45 (2006)
(identifying states' attempts to achieve parental equality through same-sex marriage and alternative
institutions); see discussion infra Parts II.D.1, III.B.6 (exploring marriage and alternative
institutions).
10. See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 64 (2000); see discussion infra Parts II.D.2,
III.B.7 (discussing third party statutes).
11. See, e.g., N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 70 (McKinney 1999) (stating that neither parent has a
prima facie right to custody, but that the court will determine custody solely on analysis of what is
in the best interest of child); Ronald FF. v. Cindy GG., 511 N.E.2d 75, 77 (N.Y. 1987) (holding that
the state may not interfere with parent-child relationship without compelling state purpose
furthering child's best interests); John Bowe, Gay Donor or Gay Dad?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19,2006,
§ 6 (Magazine) at 66 (stating courts are charged with protecting the child's best interests above all
else).
12. See, e.g., N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 70 (failing to define "parent"); Alison D. v. Virginia M.,
572 N.E.2d 27, 28 (N.Y. 1991) (ignoring a private visitation agreement and forcing coparent to
bring suit as a third party under Domestic Relations Law); Janis C. v. Christine T., 742 N.Y.S.2d
381, 383 (App. Div. 2002), appeal dismissed,754 N.Y.S.2d 203 (2002) (foreclosing the availability
of de facto parenthood); see discussion infra Part IV (pointing out the flaws in current New York
law with regard to same-sex coparents and suggesting solutions); cf Hernandez v. Robles, 855
N.E.2d 1, 12 (N.Y. 2006) (holding "that the Domestic Relations Law's limitation of marriage to
opposite-sex couples" is constitutional).
13. See, e.g., Alison D., 572 N.E.2d at 28 (ignoring a private visitation agreement and forcing
coparent to bring suit as a third party under Domestic Relations Law); Janis C., 742 N.Y.S.2d at
383 (foreclosing the availability of de facto parenthood); see discussion infra Part IV (pointing out
the flaws in the current New York law with regard to same-sex coparents and suggesting solutions);
see also In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d 397, 398, 405 (N.Y. 1995) (allowing for second parent adoption
for both same-sex and opposite-sex couples); Debra H. v. Janice R., No. 106569/08, 2008 N.Y.
Misc. LEXIS 6367, at *28 (Sup. Ct. Oct. 2, 2008) (allowing for a combination of in loco parentis
and equitable estoppel); cf Hernandez,855 N.E.2d at 12.
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coparenting agreements, judicial resolutions, and legislative action in
order to foster and preserve loving parenting relationships and to truly
serve the best interests of a child.
Part II of this Note begins by explaining the ways in which a gay or
lesbian coparent can claim some degree of parental rights over his or her
former partner's biological child, who was planned for, conceived, and
raised within the context of a committed same-sex relationship. The
benefits and weaknesses of every method are examined in each section
of this Part. Section A details second-parent adoption. Section B
describes coparenting agreements. Section C discusses the judicial
doctrines of de facto parenthood, in loco parentis, and equitable
estoppel. Section D expounds the legislative solutions of same-sex
marriage, alternatives to marriage, and third party statutes. Part III turns
to the evolution of the rights of coparents in New York State, examining
the past in Section A and detailing the transition to the present in Section
B. Section B reviews New York State's approach to each method of
asserting parental rights. Part IV identifies changes that need to be made
in the law of New York in order to suit the needs of the modern family.
Part V concludes that each remedy must be available to same-sex
coparents to protect the best interests of the children of same-sex
couples.
II. RECOGNIZING THE RIGHTS OF SAME-SEX COPARENTS

For the most part, the traditional avenues of determining parentage
and its rights have not been made available to same-sex coparents.
However, the legal system and legislatures have not universally failed to
recognize the changing composition of families. In fact, there are a
variety of methods used to grant parental rights to same-sex coparents,
including second-parent adoption, coparenting agreements, equitable
concepts, and legislative solutions. 14 Unfortunately, none of these tactics
completely protects the coparent-child relationship. The shortcomings of
the various systems undermine or even ignore legal relationships within
a nontraditional family, and thus disregard the actual relationship
between a child and his or her coparent. To better explore these issues,
the following sections will detail the protection and the failings of the
means available to legally connect coparents to their children.
14. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 64 (discussing third party statutes); Forman, supra note 9, at 44-45
(discussing state legislation that allows same-sex marriage and alternative institutions). See
generally Osborne, supra note 7 (discussing second-parent adoption, coparenting agreements, de
facto parenthood, in loco parentis determinations, and equitable estoppel).
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A. Second-ParentAdoption
First, second-parent adoption enables a coparent, as a third party, to
adopt his or her child without displacing the parental rights of the
biological parent.15 This form of adoption is currently the best way for a
coparent to fortify the legal parental relationship because it places the
coparent in legal parity with the biological parent.' 6 On the other hand, a
traditional adoption would require the biological parent to terminate all
of his or her parental rights before the coparent could adopt.17 This
arrangement strips one parent of his or her rights before the other can be
awarded rights, a ridiculous result in a coparenting situation.
Accordingly, some courts and legislatures have recognized the
impracticality of imposing this traditional structure on nontraditional
families, and have allowed same-sex coparents to adopt their children
without requiring the biological parents to relinquish their rights. For
example, In re Adoption ofB.L. VB. held that a typical adoption statute's
general purpose was "to clarify and protect the legal rights of the
adopted person . . ., not to proscribe adoptions by certain combinations
of individuals."18 Thus, while state law normally required the
termination of parental rights before adoption, the court found that
"when the family unit is comprised of the natural mother and her
partner, and the adoption is in the best interests of the children,
terminating the natural mother's rights is unreasonable and
unnecessary."' 9
However, although second-parent adoption offers the best
protection of the legal relationship between a coparent and his or her
15. Osborne, supra note 7, at 369; see Forman, supra note 9, at 43-44; Kris Franklin, The
"Authoritative Moment": Exploring the Boundaries of Interpretationin the Recognition of Queer
Families, 32 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 655, 684 (2006); Polikoff, supra note 8, at 524-25; Kyle C.
Velte, Towards ConstitutionalRecognition of the Lesbian-ParentedFamily, 26 N.Y.U. REV. L. &
Soc. CHANGE 245, 252 (2000). But see Laura L. Williams, Note, The Unheard Victims of the
Refusal to Legalize Same-Sex Marriage: The Reluctance to Recognize Same-Sex Partners as
Parents Instead of Strangers, 9 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 419, 430-31 (2005) (discussing the
limitations of second-parent adoptions in states that narrowly construe the law to apply only to
opposite-sex parents).
16. Osborne, supranote 7, at 369.
17. E.g., In re Adoption of B.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271, 1273 (Vt. 1993) (examining an adoption
statute that states "[t]he natural parents of a minor shall be deprived, by the adoption, of all legal
right to control of such minor, and such minor shall be freed from all obligations of obedience and
maintenance to them" except in the instance of a stepparent adoption, where the biological parent is
married to the adopting party). This exception, of course, creates a challenging structural inequity as
same-sex coparents are usually prohibited from marrying and thus cannot qualify for the stepparent
exception.
18. Id. at 1274.
19. Id at 1272.
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child, second-parent adoption has a number of weaknesses, such as
limited availability 20 and time-consuming, expensive procedures. 2 1
These weaknesses expose the coparent and his or her child to enormous
risk, and impose costs on both the family and the courts.
Second-parent adoption is available in twenty-five states and the
District of Columbia. 2 2 However, the legality of second-parent adoption
under state statutes is unclear in twenty-one states.23 Additionally,
appellate courts in three states have ruled that state adoption law does
not allow for second-parent adoption. 24 Further, six states have laws
restricting the ability to adopt based either directly or indirectly on
sexual orientation. 25
Thus, the legitimacy of second-parent adoption is vulnerable to
hostile interpretation without clear legislative approval. For example, In
20. NAT'L GAY & LESBIAN TASK FORCE, ANTI-ADOPTION LAWS IN THE U.S.

1 (2008),

http://www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/reports/issue-maps/adoption laws_07_09_color.pdf
[hereinafter ANTI-ADOPTION] (visual representation of the states that restrict gay adoption); NAT'L
GAY & LESBIAN TASK FORCE, SECOND-PARENT ADOPTION IN THE U.S. 1 (2007),
SECOND-PARENT
[hereinafter
http://www.outfront.org/files/pg332/Secondparentadoption.pdf
ADOPTION] (visual representation of status of second-parent adoption in the United States).
21.

See CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, U.S. DEP'T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., COSTS OF

ADOPTING 2 (2004), http://www.childwelfare.gov/pubs/s-cost/s-costs.pdf [hereinafter GATEWAY]
(stating adoption can cost up to $40,000); Dave Thomas Found. for Adoption, Adoption Facts:
F.A.Q., http://www.davethomasfoundation.org/Adoption-Facts/F-A-Q- [hereinafter Dave Thomas
Found.] (last visited Mar. 24, 2010) (estimating the average adoption proceeding lasts one to two
years).
22. Alabama, Alaska, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia,
Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada,
New Mexico, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Texas, Vermont, and
Washington. CAL. FAM. CODE § 9000(b) (West 2004); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-5-203(d.5)
(West 2009); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-724(3) (West 2004); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § I102(b) (2007); Sharon S. v. Superior Court, 73 P.3d 554, 561, 570 (Cal. 2003); In re M.M.D., 662
A.2d 837, 862 (D.C. 1995); In re K.M., 653 N.E.2d 888, 899 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995); In re Adoption of
K.S.P., 804 N.E.2d 1253, 1260 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004); In re Adoption of M.M.G.C., 785 N.E.2d 267,
270-71 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003); Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315, 321 (Mass. 1993); In re
Adoption of Two Children by H.N.R., 666 A.2d 535, 536 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995); In re
Jacob, 660 N.E.2d 397, 398 (N.Y. 1995); In re Adoption of R.B.F., 803 A.2d 1195, 1202 (Pa.
2002); SECOND-PARENT ADOPTION, supra note 20.
23. Arizona, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Mississippi, Missouri,
Montana, New Hampshire, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South
Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wyoming. SECOND-PARENT ADOPTION,
supranote 20, at 1.
24. Nebraska, Ohio, and Wisconsin. In re Adoption of Luke, 640 N.W.2d 374, 383 (Neb.
2002); In re Adoption of Doe, 719 N.E.2d 1071, 1073 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998); Georgina G. v. Terry
M. (In re Angel Lace M.), 516 N.W.2d 678, 686 (Wis. 1994).
25. Arkansas, Florida, Michigan, Mississippi, Nebraska, and Utah. ANTI-ADOPTION, supra
note 20, at 1. But see In re Adoption of Doe, 2008 WL 5006172, at *29 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Nov. 25, 2008)
(holding Florida's statute prohibiting "homosexual" individuals from adopting violated equal
protection rights of the adopting petitioner and children without satisfying the rational basis test).
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re Adoption of Luke affirmed that a coparent could not adopt her child
because the partner/biological mother had not relinquished her parental
26
2
rights. Conversely to In re Adoption of B.L. VB.,27 the court concluded
that the statute was "clear that . .. the parents' parental rights must be
terminated ... in order for the child to be eligible for adoption." 2 8 Here,
the court declined to acknowledge that requiring a biological parent to
relinquish his or her rights was "unreasonable and unnecessary," 29 but
rather insisted that reading an exception into the statute for same-sex
coparents went against the presumption "that the Legislature intended a
sensible, rather than an absurd, result."30
Unfortunately, a coparent-child relationship is not sufficiently
protected even by the explicit availability of second-parent adoption
because the process is time-consuming and can be very expensive. 3 1
Until the adoption is completed, the coparent is a third party to the
parent-child relationship, and as such is exposed to a number of risks,
including the death of the legal parent or the revocation of the legal
parent's consent to the adoption.32 Relatively little attention has been
directed towards the dissolution of same-sex families, perhaps for fear
that focus on negative aspects of a same-sex union will only fuel
arguments that "gays are an inherently unstable, promiscuous lot." 33
Nevertheless, it is clear that not all couples, whether of the same- or
opposite-sex, will last forever. 34 Same-sex couples with children discuss
and even pursue adoption, but may fail to complete the lengthy,
expensive process before the relationship dissolves, and the biological
parent revokes his or her consent.3 5 Exactly this scenario led to the
dispute in Lynda A.H. v. Diane TO. 3 6 There, the court found that the
coparent did not have standing to petition for custody and visitation after
26. 640 N.W.2d at 382-83.
27. 628 A.2d 1271, 1274 (Vt. 1993) (holding that the adoption statute's general purpose was
"to clarify and protect the legal rights of the adopted person...,not to proscribe adoptions by
certain combinations of individuals").
28. In re Adoption ofLuke, 640 N.W.2d at 382-83.
29. In re Adoption ofB.L. VB., 628 A.2d at 1272.
30. In re Adoption ofLuke, 640 N.W.2d at 382.
31. See Dave Thomas Found., supra note 21 (estimating the average adoption proceeding
lasts one to two years); GATEWAY, supranote 21, at 2 (stating adoption can cost up to $40,000).
32. See Polikoff, supra note 8, at 527-42 (discussing the consequences of the biological
mother's death and the dissolution of the relationship in lesbian parenting couples).
33. Mary Coombs, Insiders and Outsiders: What the American Law Institute Has Done for
Gay and Lesbian Families,8 DuKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 87,88 (2001).
34. Id.
35. See Forman, supra note 9, at 46 (examining the reasons why coparents who can adopt
elect not to, including lack of consent).
36. 673 N.Y.S.2d 989, 990 (App. Div. 1998).
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a lower court had dismissed sua sponte a petition to adopt when the
parties separated and the legal mother revoked her permission.37 It is
crucial here that adoption was foreclosed to the coparent; she was forced
to resort to a petition for custody or visitation for which she did not have
standing as a third party to the parent-child relationship. 38 Despite the
obvious familial relationship39 and legally manifested intention to adopt,
the court actively terminated a petition for adoption the instant the
biological parent revoked her consent in the context of a break-up.40 In
this unfortunate situation, the coparent is often left with no legal
recourse and an unprotected parent-child relationship.
Thus, second-parent adoption is an adaptation of traditional
adoption law that permits a same-sex coparent to be declared a legal
parent with all the rights and obligations of traditional parenthood
without stripping the biological parent of his or her rights. 4 1 However,
very few states have modified their adoption laws to incorporate second42
parent adoption. More states, in fact, have expressly limited the
availability of any form of adoption on the basis of sexual orientation.43
However, even where second-parent adoption is allowed, either
statutorily or through judicial initiative, the process fails to offer
adequate protection to nontraditional families.4 4 Before the protracted
and costly adoption process is complete, there may be no legal
acknowledgement whatsoever of an already well-formed, loving, and
nurturing parental relationship.45

37. Id. at 990-91.
38. See id.
39. See id. at 990 (listing facts that make clear that petitioner and child shared a parent-child
bond).
40. See id.
41. See, e.g., In re Adoption of B.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271, 1272 (Vt. 1993); Forman, supra
note 9, at 43-44; Franklin, supra note 15, at 684; Polikoff, supra note 8, at 522-27; Velte, supra note
15, at 252; Osborne, supra note 7, at 369; Williams, supra note 15, at 430-31.
42. See SECOND-PARENT ADOPTION, supra note 20, at I (noting that only California,
Colorado, Connecticut, and Vermont have expressly authorized by statute second-parent adoption).
43. See ANTI-ADOPTION, supra note 20 (indicating that Arkansas, Florida, Michigan,
Mississippi, Nebraska, and Utah have statutes restricting adoption based either directly or indirectly
on sexual orientation).
44. See, e.g., Lynda A.H., 673 N.Y.S.2d at 990-91; see Polikoff, supra note 8, at 527-42; see
supra notes 31-40 and accompanying text.
45. See Polikoff, supra note 8, at 527-42.
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B. CoparentingAgreements
Next, the second method coparents employ to document a parentchild relationship is a coparenting agreement. These agreements are
statements coparents make to express their understanding of their
parental rights and obligations. 4 6 For example, a pre-birth decree is a
filed document that names the coparents as the legal parents of a child
before the child is born.4 7 Also, visitation agreements outline parental
rights and responsibilities after a relationship has dissolved. 4 8 These
agreements may be enforceable in court. 4 9 However, their enforceability
is questionable, and they may only serve, at best, as evidence of the
parties' intent.o
When honored, a coparenting agreement can give standing to a
coparent for a lawsuit, and may even be enforced when the agreement is
in the best interests of the child.5 1 For example, in A.C. v. C.B., the court
held that a settlement agreement between coparents gave the coparent
standing to assert her legal right to maintain an ongoing relationship
with the child.52 The court found that a parent could enter into an
agreement regarding the custody of his or her child, which can be
enforceable if that agreement is the best interests of the child.53
46. See Christensen, supra note 5, at 1352 (arguing in favor of coparenting agreements
because "[t]he planned lesbian family ought to be the ideal setting in which to give legal force to
private ordering"); Forman, supra note 9, at 47 (suggesting that written agreements can help in a de
facto determination, even if not per se enforceable); Osborne, supra note 7, at 370 ("Co-parenting
agreements are legal documents that a lesbian couple uses to explain the rights and responsibilities
of each co-parent.").
47. Osborne, supranote 7, at 371-72; see also Bowe, supra note 11 (discussing the cautionary
function of pre-birth coparenting agreements in the context of a nonanonymous sperm donation).
48. Osborne, supranote 7, at 372.
49. See A.C. v. C.B., 829 P.2d 660, 663 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992) (stating that a parent may enter
into an agreement regarding the custody of her child); In re Bonfield, 780 N.E.2d 241, 249 (Ohio
2002) (finding a shared custody agreement between lesbian coparents enforceable if in the best
interests of the children); Rubano v. DiCenzo, 759 A.2d 959, 972 (R.I. 2000) (determining that a
lower court had jurisdiction to enforce visitation agreement between lesbian coparents); Forman,
supra note 9, at 35-36 (discussing Rubano v. DiCenzo); Melanie B. Jacobs, Micah Has One Mommy
and One Legal Stranger: Adjudicating Maternityfor NonbiologicalLesbian Coparents,50 BUFF. L.
REv. 341, 383-89 (2002) (discussing Rubano v. DiCenzo).
50. Bowe, supra note 11; see also Holtzman v. Knott (In re H.S.H.-K.), 533 N.W.2d 419, 436
n.40 (Wis. 1995) ("An agreement between the parties could also indicate an adoptive or biological
parent's consent to another to establish a parent-like relationship with the child.").
51. See A.C, 829 P.2d at 664; In re Bonfield, 780 N.E.2d at 249; Rubano, 759 A.2d at 972;
Forman, supranote 9, at 35-36; Jacobs, supra note 49, at 383-89.
52. A.C., 829 P.2d at 661-62.
53. Id. at 663-64; see In re Bonfield, 780 N.E.2d at 249; Rubano, 759 A.2d at 972; Forman,
supra note 9, at 35-36; Jacobs, supra note 49, at 383-89.
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Similarly, Rubano v. DiCenzo held a written agreement in the form of a
"consent order previously entered by the court" enforceable so as to give
the coparent visitation with the child.5 4 However, the court expressly
limited its holding by differentiating the consent order from a private
agreement, noting that "a mere private agreement between two
consenting adults cannot of itself confer jurisdiction upon the Family
Court to modify or enforce the ... agreement."55
As Rubano hinted, coparenting agreements are of questionable
enforceability because some consider the agreements to be against
public policy. 5 6 Some courts simply refuse to uphold private agreements
that create marital rights on the basis that unmarried people should not
be entitled to the benefits and protections that marriage provides. 57
Under this line of thinking, a coparenting agreement that privately
arranges for such "divorce-type remedies" as visitation and child support
is not appropriate for unmarried people.58 Other courts decline to enforce
coparenting agreements as immoral contracts for children or
"parenthood by contract."59
At best, even formal agreements between coparents function merely
as evidence of their intent.60 For example, the parties in E.N.O. v.
L.MM signed a coparenting agreement both before and after the birth of
their child that explicitly expressed their intent to share parenting
responsibilities.6 1 The agreement also stated that the coparent would
retain her parental status even if the parties separated.62 However, the
agreement was not determinative in the court's decision to uphold a
reinstatement of visitation. 6 3 Rather, the court relied on a de facto parent
54. 759A.2dat961.
55. Id. at 962 n.2.
56. Williams, supra note 15, at 428 (arguing that "most courts consider" coparenting
agreements "abhorrent to public policy"); see also Rubano, 759 A.2d at 962 n.2.
57. See Mary L. Bonauto, Goodridge in Context, 40 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 16 (2005);
see also Christensen, supra note 5, at 1326 ("[M]arriage remains a legal structuring device that
cannot be significantly altered nor fully replicated by private arrangement.").
58. Bonauto, supra note 57, at 16 (discussing Collins v. Guggenheim, 631 N.E.2d 1016, 1017
(Mass. 1994)).
59. T.F. v. B.L., 813 N.E.2d 1244, 1246 (Mass. 2004); see Williams, supra note 15, at 428-30
(discussing courts that have declined to uphold coparenting agreements).
60. Bowe, supranote 11; see also Holtzman v. Knott (In re H.S.H.-K.), 533 N.W.2d 419, 436
n.40 (Wis. 1995) (holding that an agreement between coparents can indicate a legal parent's consent
to coparent to establish a parent-like relationship with the child).
61. 711 N.E.2d 886, 889 (Mass. 1999); see Forman, supra note 9, at 41 (discussing E.NO. v.
L.M.M); Velte, supra note 15, at 262 (discussing E.NO. v. L.MM.).
62. E.NO., 711 N.E.2d at 889.
63. Id. at 890-91 (stating that the court should determine whether visitation is in the best
interest of the child).
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determination, and listed the agreement as a factor that supported
finding the coparent to be a de facto parent. As this determination
shows, the court did not defer to the twice-executed explicit coparenting
agreement, but reduced it to an element that bolstered the de facto parent
determination as evidence of the coparents' intent.
Thus, a coparenting agreement does little to ensure a coparent's
parental rights. A court may find the agreement is not enforceable on
public policy grounds. Or, a court may have jurisdiction to enforce the
agreement, particularly if it is in the form of a court order, but the
agreement is still subject to the court's best interests analysis. 67
Otherwise, agreements between consenting adults are reduced to
evidence of intent.6 8 Perhaps the biggest pitfall of a coparenting
agreement is simply the idea of contracting upon the decision to have a
child; formal agreements in harmonious familial settings are infrequent
and impractical.69 It takes tremendous foresight and levelheadedness to
reduce the emotional and personal decision to have a child to a written
agreement, particularly one that provides for separation.70 As one
commentator noted, "people in love and planning to enter a life together
rarely expect to break up." 7'
C. JudicialRemedies
As a third method, in addition to the relatively non-litigious options
of second-parent adoption and coparenting agreements, nonlegal
coparents may turn to the courts for judicial remedies.72 In the past, a
coparent was a legal stranger who had no standing to interfere with the
biological parent's right to make autonomous decisions regarding the
upbringing of the child absent a showing of parental unfitness.73 The
decision in Nancy S. v. Michele G. is an example of a classic denial to

64. See discussion infra Parts I.C. 1, III.B.3 (explaining the de facto parent standard in detail).
65. E.N.O., 711 N.E.2d at 892.
66. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 15, at 428; see supranotes 56-59 and accompanying text.
67. See, e.g., In re Bonfield, 780 N.E.2d 241, 249 (Ohio 2002) (finding a shared custody
agreement between lesbian coparents enforceable if in the best interests of the children); see supra
notes 51-55 and accompanying text.
68. See, e.g., Bowe, supra note 11; see supra notes 60-65 and accompanying text.
69. See Coombs, supra note 33, at 88.
70. See id.
71. Id.
72. See also Polikoff, supra note 8, at 483-86 (discussing equitable parenthood).
73. See, e.g., Nancy S. v. Michele G., 279 Cal. Rptr. 212, 216-17 (Ct. App. 1991).
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expand the definition of "parent" to include a same-sex coparent.74
There, the court found that the litigants had been in a committed
relationship, decided to create a family, and had children. But, the
court declined to define a coparent as a parent by equitable principles for
fear of exposing "natural parents to litigation brought by child-care
providers of long standing, relatives, successive sets of stepparents or
other close friends of the family." 76 The court deferred to the legislature,
claiming that it was "not telling the parties that the issues they raise are
unworthy of legal recognition," but rather it intended "only to illustrate
the limitations of the courts in fashioning a comprehensive solution to
such a complex and socially significant issue."n
However, despite some courts' disinclination to craft equitable
remedies for nontraditional familial disputes,7 8 courts have more recently
employed equitable principles to accommodate the reality of
childrearing and parenthood in recognition of the mutable structure of
the modem family. 79 These equitable doctrines include de facto
parenthood, in loco parentis, and equitable estoppel. However, these
judge-made remedies are often denounced as inadequate "judicial
activism," and courts are chastised for failing to defer to the legislature.80
1. De Facto Parenthoods'
A de facto, or psychological, parent is a common law concept that
defines a parent "by virtue of a parent-like, caretaking role in relation to
the child."8 2 This test defines nonbiological parenthood by functionality.
74. Nancy S., 279 Cal. Rptr. at 219; see also Jacobs, supra note 49, at 380 (discussing the
court's refusal to expand the definition of parent to include the mother's partner in Nancy S. v.
Michele G.); Polikoff, supra note 8, at 539-40 (discussing Nancy S. v. Michele G.); Velte, supra
note 15, at 259 (discussing Nancy S. v. Michele G.); see also Peggy Orenstein, The Other Mother,
N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2004, § 6 (Magazine), at 24 (describing courts' fears concerning psychological
parent doctrine).
75. Nancy S., 279 Cal. Rptr. at 214.
76. Id. at 219.
77. Id.
78. See id.
79. See Polikoff, supra note 8, at 491-502 (discussing equitable estoppel and in loco
parentis); Osborne, supra note 7, at 378-85 (reviewing de facto parent and in loco parentis
doctrines).
80. See Franklin, supra note 15, at 657-58 (exploring courts' decisions "to extend legal
recognition to new family forms, especially in ... queer contexts, [and] face charges of
overstepping their authority," or "of engaging in 'judicial activism'); see infra notes 149-60 and
accompanying text.
81. The terms "de facto parent" and "psychological parent" are used interchangeably
depending on jurisdiction. For the purposes of this Note, I will use the term "de facto parent."
82. Osborne, supra note 7, at 378; see Polikoff, supra note 8, at 510 (comparing in loco
parentis to de facto parental standards); Velte, supra note 15, at 258 (explaining de facto parent
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If the coparent acts like a parent, meaning he or she cares physically and
emotionally for the child in a parental capacity without an expectation of
compensation,8 3 the court may find him or her to be a de facto parent.
This definition of parenthood takes the emphasis off of genetic
connection, and focuses on real-life interaction; a parent is a person who
parents a child.
Working with this general definition in mind, courts have created
several bifurcated analysis tests of standing and best interests of the
child to determine who qualifies as a de facto parent.84 In particular, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court formulated a popular analysis in Holtzman v.
Knott,85 which combines a four-prong test for de facto parenthood with a
requirement for a "triggering event," in which the legal parent
6
substantially interferes with the coparent's relationship with the child. 8
Justifying the exercise of its equitable powers, the court noted that
[w]hen a non-traditional adult relationship is dissolving, the child is as
likely to become a victim of turmoil and adult hostility as is a child
subject to the dissolution of a marriage. Such a child needs and
deserves the protection of the courts as much as a child of a dissolving
traditional relationship.87
Under this test, the petitioner must demonstrate his or her "parent-like
relationship with the child" by proving the following four elements:
(1) that the biological or adoptive parent consented to, and fostered, the
petitioner's formation and establishment of a parent-like relationship
with the child; (2) that the petitioner and the child lived together in the
same household; (3) that the petitioner assumed obligations of
parenthood by taking significant responsibility for the child's care,
education and development, including contributing towards the child's
doctrine); Williams, supranote 15, at 431-37 (discussing different courts' use of the de facto parent
concept).
83. See, e.g., Holtzman v. Knott (In re H.S.H.-K.), 533 N.W.2d 419,435-36 (Wis. 1995).
84. Osborne, supra note 7, at 376.
85. 533 N.W.2d at 435-36; see William B. Turner, The Lesbian De Facto ParentStandardin
Holtzman v. Knott: Judicial Policy Innovation and Diffusion, 22 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST.
135, 141-45 (2007).
86. Holtzman, 533 N.W.2d at 435; see also Forman, supra note 9, at 28-29; Jacobs, supra
note 49, at 358; Velte, supra note 15, at 262-63 (explaining Holtzman v. Knott); see also Turner,
supra note 85, at 139 ("[S]tate supreme courts should recognize the visitation rights of de facto
parents, thus giving trial judges the leeway to order visitation with the co-parent where the facts
demonstrate that doing so is in the best interest of the child.").
87. Holtzman, 533 N.W.2d at 421; see Turner, supra note 85, at 143 ("[T]he court justified its
use of equitable power to grant permission to petition for visitation in a circumstance that the statute
did not expressly address by reference to the legislature's frequent repetition of the child's best
interest as the paramount policy priority in all cases of custody and visitation.").
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support, without expectation of financial compensation; and (4) that
the petitioner has been in a parental role for a length of time sufficient
to have established with the child a bonded, dependent relationship
parental in nature.8 8
The court concluded that its use
of equitable power protects parental autonomy and constitutional rights
by requiring that the parent-like relationship develop only with the
consent and assistance of the biological or adoptive parent. It also
protects a child's best interest by preserving the child's relationship
with an adult who has been like a parent. 89
In addition to proving the four above elements, the petitioning
coparent also must prove that the legal parent has substantially interfered
with the coparent's relationship with the child, and that the coparent
pursued "court ordered visitation within a reasonable time after" the
legal parent's interference. 90 The court required this "triggering event"
because of a "continuing legislative concern with identifying the
triggering events that warrant state interference in an otherwise protected
parent-child relationship." 9 1 With this requirement, the court recognized
and respected the strength of the presumption in favor of the legal
parent's constitutionally protected autonomy, even in the face of the
legal parent's fostering of a parental relationship between the child and
the coparent. 9 2 Thus, a court applying this standard will not declare a
coparent to be a de facto parent until there is a substantial conflict
between the legal parent and the coparent, in which the legal parent
restricts the coparent-child relationship.
Other courts have adopted and refined the Wisconsin test.94 For
example, the Washington Supreme Court adopted the Holtzman v. Knott
standard, but "dropped the need for a 'triggering event"' 9 5 and placed the
88. Holtzman, 533 N.W.2d at 421 & n.2 ("A petitioner's contribution to a child's support
need not be monetary.").
89. Id at 436; see Turner, supra note 85, at 144-45 (discussing the importance of the first
element of the Holtzman test).
90. Holtzman, 533 N.W.2d at 421.
91. Id.at427.
92. See id. at 429-30; Turner, supra note 85, at 144 (discussing triggering event requirement
of the Holtzman standard).
93. See Holtzman, 533 N.W.2d at 436.
94. See, e.g., V.C. v. M.J.B, 748 A.2d 539, 551-54 (N.J. 2000) (adopting the Holtzman test,
giving more specific guidelines and explaining the significance of the prongs); see also Forman,
supra note 9, at 32-33 (discussing V.C. v. MJ.B.); Jacobs,supra note 49, at 359-63 (discussing VC.
v. MJB.).
95. Turner, supra note 85, at 149.
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de facto parent in parity with the legal parent, subject to the best interests
of the child. 96 Instead of requiring a triggering event to justify state
intervention in the parent-child relationship, the court does not
characterize its action as "intervention" at all:
The State is not interfering on behalf of a third party in an insular
family unit but is enforcing the rights and obligations of parenthood
that attach to de facto parents; a status that can be achieved only
through the active encouragement of the biological or adoptive parent
by affirmatively establishing a family unit with the defacto parent and
child or children that accompany the family. In sum, we find that the
rights and responsibilities which we recognize as attaching to defacto
parents do not infringe on the fundamental liberty interests of the other
legal parent in the family unit. 97
Thus, the holding rendered "the crux of' the legal parent's
"constitutional arguments moot" because it established that a de facto
parent and the legal parent would "both have a 'fundamental liberty
interest[]' in the 'care, custody, and control"' of the child."
However, there are other variations in de facto standards across
jurisdictions, such as the broader definitional standard enunciated in
E.N.O. v. L.MM 99 There, Massachusetts forewent an enumerated test,
and opted rather to define a de facto parent as follows:
A de facto parent is one who has no biological relation to the child, but
has participated in the child's life as a member of the child's family.
The de facto parent resides with the child and, with the consent and
encouragement of the legal parent, performs a share of caretaking
functions at least as great as the legal parent.. . . The de facto parent
shapes the child's daily routine, addresses his developmental needs,
disciplines the child, provides for his education and medical care, and
serves as a moral guide [for reasons other than financial
compensation]. 100
In determining de facto parentage, the court stated that "the best interests
calculus must include an examination of the child's relationship with
both his legal and de facto parent," and suggested that courts consider

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

In re Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d 161, 176-77 (Wash. 2005).
Id. at 179 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 178 (alteration in original) (quoting Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000)).
711 N.E.2d 886, 891 (Mass. 1999).
Id.; see Jacobs, supra note 49, at 363-66 (discussing E.N. 0. v. L.MM).
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the factors previously set forth in the context of heterosexual parenting
couples in examining the child's relationship with the de facto parent.' 0 '
Similarly, the court in In re E.L.MC. expressly declined to adopt
any fixed standard for determining a de facto parent.10 2 The court noted
that the narrower definitions of de facto parenthood were "useful to
restrict the class of nonparents who may seek parental rights," but found
that even under its jurisdiction's broader definition, 03 the "denial or
significant limitation of contact with a [de facto] parent creates an
inherent risk of harm to a young child's emotional well-being."1 04
"Accordingly, and without precisely defining all attributes of a [de facto]
parent," the court concluded "that emotional harm to a young child is
intrinsic in the termination or significant curtailment of the child's
relationship with a [de facto] parent under any definition of that term." 105
This holding, which made the restraint or termination of a de facto
parent-child relationship harmful as a matter of law, silenced the legal
parent's constitutional challenges to the court's interference in the
parental relationship.' 0 6
Thus, de facto parenthood is an equitable concept that courts can
use to find a coparent to be a parent.'0 7 There are a variety of tests,
ranging from the very particularized standard enunciated in Holtzman v.
Knott'0 8 and its manifestations in other jurisdictions,' 09 to the definitional
standard of E.N.O. v. L.MM,110 to the explicit rejection of any
definition, as in In re E.L.M C."' No matter what test is used, the court
101. E.N.O., 711 N.E.2d at 891; see also Elisa B. v. Superior Court, 117 P.3d 660, 662, 670
(Cal. 2005) (applying the Uniform Parentage Act to two women as it would a man and a woman,
and holding a person "who agreed to raise children with her lesbian partner, supported her partner's
[conception], and received the resulting ... children into her home and held them out as her own, is
the children's parent"); Forman, supra note 9, at 36-39 (discussing Elisa B. and using the Uniform
Parentage Act to achieve parental equality).
102. 100 P.3d 546, 561 (Colo. App. 2004); see Forman, supra note 9, at 26-28 (discussing In re
E.L.MC.).
103. In re E.L.M.C., 100 P.3d at 559, 561 (defining psychological parent as "'someone other
than a biological parent who develops a parent-child relationship with a child through day-to-day
interaction, companionship, and caring for the child' (quoting In re Marriage of Martin, 42 P.3d
75, 77-78 (Colo. App. 2002))).
104. InreE.L.MC., 100P.3dat561.
105. Id.
106. See id at 562.
107. See Velte, supra note 15, at 258 (explaining de facto parent concept); see supra notes 81106 and accompanying text.
108. 533 N.W.2d 419, 435-36 (Wis. 1995).
109. See, e.g., V.C. v. M.J.B, 748 A.2d 539, 551-54 (N.J. 2000); In re Parentage of L.B., 122
P.3d 161, 176-77 (Wash. 2005).
110. 711 N.E.2d 886, 891 (Mass. 1999).
111. 100 P.3d 546, 561 (Colo. App. 2004).
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must grapple with the parent's constitutional right to direct his or her
child's upbringing free from the interference of the state.' 12 In Holtzman,
the triggering event justified state inference." 3 On the other hand, the
court in In re Parentageof L.B. found that the status of de facto parent
entitled the coparent to an equal fundamental parental right, and thus the
court's intervention was not interference at all.1 4 In re E.L.M C. took an
even different approach, making the deprivation of a de facto parental
relationship harmful to the child as a matter of law, justifying the
interference. 15
In sum, a de facto determination is a judicial attempt to give legal
significance to an important and actual parenting relationship that would
be otherwise ignored by an unsympathetic legal system. While the
Holtzman test is useful because it offers concrete criteria to better assess
the existence of a de facto relationship, it is troubling that a court cannot
find a coparent to be a de facto parent before there is serious conflict."' 6
This arrangement does not seem to be in the best interests of the child, as
his or her relationship with the coparent will have already been
interrupted." 7 More practically, the courts in E.N.O. and In re E.L.MC.
entreat the legal system to look at the reality of the situation, and
determine if a coparent-child relationship exists by considering factors
used in any such determination, regardless of the sexual orientations of
the parents." 8 Perhaps a combination of the two justifications, that the
coparent has constitutional rights equal to those of the legal parent" 9 and
that interference in the child's relationship with the coparent is harmful
as a matter of law,' 20 form the best basis for court intervention without
requiring that the damage already be done.121
2. In Loco Parentis
The legal doctrine of in loco parentis, meaning "in the place of the
parent," implicates that a coparent has assumed parental status by
accepting and executing the obligations of a parent with the consent of

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
1999).
119.
120.
121.

Id. at 562; E.N.O., 711 N.E.2d at 893; see also Holtzman, 533 N.W.2d at 435.
See Holtzman, 533 N.W.2d at 421, 427, 435.
See In re Parentage ofL.B., 122 P.3d at 178.
See In re E.L.M.C, 100 P.3d at 561.
See Holtzman, 533 N.W.2d at 421,436.
See, e.g., id. at 436.
See In re E.L.MC., 100 P.3d at 561; E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886, 891 (Mass.
See In re Parentage ofL.B., 122 P.3d at 178.
In re E.L.MC., 100 P.3d at 561.
E.g., Holtzman, 533 N.W.2d at 436.
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the legal parent.122 For example, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
explained that in loco parentis "refers to a person who puts oneself in
the situation of a lawful parent by assuming the obligations incident to
the parental relationship without going through the formality of a legal
adoption."l 2 3 The court stated that the doctrine requires "first, the
assumption of a parental status, and, second, the discharge of parental
duties."1 24 The status of in loco parentis, which carries with it exactly
the same "rights and liabilities . . . as between parent and child," cannot
be achieved "in defiance of the parents' wishes and the parent/child
relationship."1 2 5 In TB. v. L.R.M, the Pennsylvania court rebuffed the
litigant's challenge to the common law doctrine as interfering with her
parental rights and as being outside of the court's province, more
properly left to the legislature:
The in loco parentis basis for standing recognizes that the need to
guard the family from intrusions by third parties and to protect the
rights of the natural parent must be tempered by the paramount need to
protect the child's best interest. Thus, while it is presumed that a
child's best interest is served by maintaining the family's privacy and
autonomy, that presumption must give way where the child has
established strong psychological bonds with a person who, although
not a biological parent, has lived with the child and provided care,
nurture, and affection, assuming in the child's eye a stature like that of
a parent. Where such a relationship is shown, our courts recognize that
the child's best interest requires that the third party be granted standing
so as to have the opportunity to litigate fully the issue of whether that
relationship should be maintained even over a natural parent's
objections.126
Thus, the child's best interest in maintaining a parental relationship may
trump the parent's constitutional right to autonomy. The court also noted
that a "biological parent's rights 'do not extend to erasing a relationship
between her partner and her child which she voluntarily created and
actively fostered simply because after the parties' separation she
regretted having done so."'l27

122. Osborne, supra note 7, at 382-83; see Polikoff, supra note 8, at 502 (explaining in loco
parentis); Velte, supra note 15, at 285 (defining in loco parentis).
123. T.B. v. L.R.M., 786 A.2d 913, 916 (Pa. 2001); see also Forman, supra note 9, at 30-31
(discussing TB. v. L.R.M); Velte, supra note 15, at 260-61(discussing TB. v. L.R.M).
124. TB., 786 A.2d at 916-17.
125. Id. at 917.
126. Id at 917 (quoting J.A.L. v. E.P.H., 682 A.2d 1314, 1319-20 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996)).
127. Id at 919 (quoting J.A.L., 682 A.2d at 1322).
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While in loco parentis has doctrinal similarities to de facto
parenthood,12 8 in loco parentis does not legally empower the coparent
nearly as much as de facto status.12 9 Clearly, there is little difference
between the broader definitional standards of a de facto parent and the
principle of in locos parentis; both require a showing of day-to-day
involvement in the child's life so as to fill the role of a parent with the
approval of the legal parent.130 However, whereas the de facto status
places the coparent in legal parity with the legal parent,' ' in loco
parentis merely awards standing to a coparent to bring suit as a third
party.132 Thus, in loco parentis provides very little protection to a
coparent because of the high evidentiary burden he or she will be forced
to carry as a third party intruding on the private parent-child
relationship. 133
3. Equitable Estoppel
In addition to the de facto parent and in loco parentis doctrines,
courts have also employed equitable estoppel in custody and visitation
proceedings to affirm the parentage of a coparent.134 The use of the
equitable estoppel doctrine in this context turns on the idea that acts by
the legal parent that hold out the family as headed by the two same-sex
coparents, such as hyphenating the child's last name, accepting child
support, or signing a coparenting agreement, should prevent a biological
coparent from disclaiming the nonlegal coparent's relationship to their
child.'
For example, the court in Kristine H. v. Lisa R. held the legal parent
estopped from attacking the validity of a stipulation she filed with the
court while she was pregnant that named her then-partner as the child's
coparent.' 3 6 The court concluded that because she "enjoyed the benefits
of that judgment for nearly two years, it would be unfair both to Lisa and
128. See discussion supra Part IL.C.I.
129. See Osborne, supra note 7, at 384-85 (explaining disadvantages of in loco parentisstatus).
130. See T.B., 786 A.2d at 916 (defining in loco parentis); Polikoff, supra note 8, at 510
(comparing in loco parentis and de facto parenthood); Osborne, supra note 7, at 378 (defining de
facto parenthood).
131. See, e.g., In re Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d 161, 177 (Wash. 2005) (holding de facto
parent in legal parity with legal parent).
132. See, e.g., TB, 786 A.2d at 914 (applying in loco parentis as a method for standing);
Osborne, supra note 7, at 384-85.
133. Osborne, supra note 7, at 385.
134. See Polikoff, supra note 8, at 491 (exploring equitable estoppel theories); Velte, supra
note 15, at 284-85 (explaining doctrine of equitable estoppel).
135. Polikoff, supranote 8, at 499.
136. 117 P.3d 690, 692 (Cal. 2005).
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the child to permit Kristine to challenge the validity of that judgment."l 3 7
The court reasoned that allowing the challenge would permit the legal
parent to "'trifle with the courts"' and "contravene the public policy
favoring that a child has two parents rather than one."' 3 8 While the court
was primarily concerned with "'the functioning of the courts,"' and
secondarily with "'other considerations of public policy,"'l 3 9 it is
important to note that the court came to the proper resolution; it did not
allow a biological coparent to curtail or dissolve a parental bond that she
fostered and encouraged simply because the adult relationship had

ended.140
However, equitable estoppel offers little to no protection to
coparents because use of the doctrine is truly up to the ruling court.141
While this court exercised its equitable powers to indirectly protect the
coparent's rights and duties and the child's best interests, other courts
may not have behaved the same way. 14 2 For example, the Supreme Court
of California in Kristine H. v. Lisa R. reversed the Court of Appeal,
which previously found the stipulated judgment to be void.14 3 In addition
to being subject to a court's discretion, access to the doctrine at all
depends on a series of fortuitous circumstances.1 44 First, there must be a
judgment or perhaps other acts of the legal parent that are now in the
coparent's favor.14 5 Then, the legal parent must challenge the coparent's
rights.14 6 Next, the court must be sympathetic to the coparent. 147 If all
these factors align, then perhaps a favorable judgment will be upheld.148
This kind of gamble is no way to ensure that coparent-child bonds will
be legally protected.

137. Id. at 696.
138. Id (quoting Nancy B. v. Charlotte M. (In re Adoption of Matthew B.-M.), 284 Cal. Rptr.
18, 34 (Ct. App. 1991)).
139. Kristine H., 117 P.3d at 695 (quoting In re Griffin, 431 P.2d 625, 629 (Cal. 1967)).
140. Kristine H., 117 P.3d at 693, 696.
141. Compare id. at 693 (holding legal parent estopped from challenging the validity of the
judgment), with Kristine Renee H. v. Lisa Ann R., 16 Cal. Rptr. 3d 123, 126 (Ct. App. 2004)
(invalidating judgment).
142. Compare Kristine H., 117 P.3d at 693 (holding legal parent estopped from challenging the
validity of the judgment), with Kristine Renee H., 16 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 126 (invalidating judgment).
143. Kristine H., 117 P.3d at 693.
144. See, e.g., Kristine H., 117 P.3d at 695-96 (listing all of the fortuitous factors).
145. See, e.g., id at 696 (stipulated judgment that both women were parents of the child).
146. See, e.g., id. at 692 (biological parent challenging validity of stipulated judgment).
147. See, e.g., id. at 696 (unfair to coparent to allow biological parent to challenge judgment).
148. Compare id. at 693 (legal parent estopped from challenging the validity of the judgment),
with Kristine Renee H. v. Lisa Ann R., 16 Cal. Rptr. 3d 123, 126 (Ct. App. 2004) (invalidating
judgment).
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For this reason and others, the exercise of judicial equitable powers
is subject to strong criticisms and weaknesses as inappropriately
infringing upon legislative province and fashioning insufficient
solutions.14 9 To critics, the exercise of judicial equitable powers is
"judicial activism," with judges legislating from the bench, and thus
exceeding their authority.so Take, for example, Judge Bellacosa's
dissent in In re Jacob, which criticized the majority for exceeding its
authority and violating legislative intent when it interpreted state
adoption law to allow for second-parent adoptions:1s1
[I]f the Legislature had intended to alter the definitions and interplay of
its plenary, detailed adoption blueprint to cover the circumstances as
presented here, it has had ample and repeated opportunities, means and
words to effectuate such purpose plainly and definitively as a matter of
notice, guidance, stability and reliability. It has done so
before ... . Because the Legislature did not do so here, neither should
this Court in this manner.152
This dissent echoes the concern of the majority in Nancy S. v. Michele
G. that the courts are not capable of "fashioning a comprehensive
solution to such a complex and socially significant issue."l 53 Thus, Judge
Bellacosa urged that the court enforce the law as written by the
legislature, without stretching the statutes to fit novel circumstances.1 5 4
Admittedly, critics of the exercise of judicial power without express
legislative blessing have a point when they focus on the blurred line
between construing and making the law; without a comprehensive
solution, the inconsistent individual solutions of each court engender
confusion and anxiety.s The standards and burdens vary widely across

149. See Jacobs, supra note 49, at 355 ("Equitable principles alone are not sufficient to
adequately address the lesbian coparent dilemma."); see also id. at 366-68.
150. See, e.g., In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d 397, 414 (N.Y. 1995) (Bellacosa, J., dissenting); see
also Franklin,supra note 15, at 657-58 ("Courts deciding to extend legal recognition to new family
forms, especially in ... queer contexts, face charges of overstepping their authority. That is, of
engaging in 'judicial activism."').
151. In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d at 406 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting).
152. Id. at 414 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting).
153. Nancy S. v. Michele G., 279 Cal. Rptr. 212, 219 (Ct. App. 1991); see In re Jacob, 660
N.E.2d at 414 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting).
154. In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d at 414 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting).
155. See Velte, supra note 15, at 256 ("Instability characterizes the present legal landscape of
lesbian-parented family disputes."); Williams, supra note 15, at 436 ("Without a clear, legally
recognized right such as that conferred by marriage, same-sex co-parents may be apprehensive in
petitioning the court in fear of a homophobic response and instead force themselves to treat the
situation as if their child had died. The non-legal parents that decide to pursue litigation will
sacrifice years of their lives and large amount of money with no definite award.").
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jurisdictions.156 A litigant does not know, in the absence of clear
statutory guidance, if his or her individual case will meet the equitable
standards.' 5 7 One commentator has theorized that coparents might
hesitate to bring a lawsuit for "fear of a homophobic response and
instead force themselves to treat the situation as if their child had
died."' 58 The coparents who decide to bring suit will no doubt spend
large sums of money and years litigating with no guarantees of a

favorable result.159
D. Legislative Solutions
Unlike the exercise of equitable powers, the fourth method,
legislative solutions, can offer structured and universal protection to
nontraditional families.1 6 0 In fact, the benefits of legislation directly and
comprehensively address the inadequacies of judicial responses to this
"complex and socially significant issue."16 1 With statutory guidance,
courts will no longer be forced to fashion individual resolutions to reach
equitable results, or to stretch the interpretations of laws that perhaps
never contemplated nontraditional family compositions.16 2 Thus,
legislative articulation of the rights and obligations of same-sex parents
can serve to increase the consistency of resolutions, and leaves less up to
the discretion of an individual judge.16 3 This improved stability can help
families headed by same-sex coparents to structure their relationships
around articulated universal legal standards, and relieves some of the
anxiety and confusion created by the current uncertainty of their rights
and obligations.
There are two primary types of legislative solutions that attempt to
modernize family law to meet the demands of today's changing family

156. See Velte, supra note 15, at 256 ("[T]he protection of the non-legal parent-child
relationship depends solely on jurisdictional location of the lesbian-parented family when it
dissolves.").
157. Seesupra note 155.
158. Williams, supra note 15, at 436.
159. Id. at 436.
160. See id. at 420 ("The best interests of the child require that legislatures grant legal
recognition to same-sex relationships so that children and parents in today's society can all receive
the same rights and be subject to the same obligations of the parent-child relationship.").
161. Nancy S. v. Michele G., 279 Cal. Rptr. 212, 219 (Ct. App. 1991).
162. See, e.g., In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d 397, 405 (N.Y. 1995); Adoption of B.L.V.B., 628 A.2d
1271, 1274 (Vt. 1993) (allowing second-parent adoption as comporting with "the general intent and
spirit" of state adoption law); Forman, supranote 9, at 44 (discussing Adoption ofB.L. VB.).
163. See supra notes 141-43 and accompanying text.
164. See supra notes 155-60 and accompanying text.
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composition: same-sex marriagel65 and third party statutes.16 6 However,
the statutory provisions that offer recognition to same-sex coparents are
flawed in that they are not universally available, vary widely across
jurisdictions, and often fail to address the issues without prejudice.
1. Marriage
First, same-sex marriage promises the identical protections to samesex coparents and their children as traditional marriage affords families
headed by opposite-sex parents.16 If the partners marry before the
conception of their child, the coparent will usually be afforded
immediate "full parental status"l 6 8 due to both "the common law
presumption of legitimacy, that a husband is deemed to be the father of
any child born during a marriage," 69 and many statutes that follow the
common law rule.170 Thus, both coparents would automatically be on
equal footing with regards to their child. Also, divorce remedies
formerly foreclosed to same-sex couples would be fully available.171
Therefore, the methods and principles of marital dissolution developed
over the years in the context of traditional families could easily be
applied to nontraditional families.' 7 2 Unfortunately, same-sex marriage
is available in only five states.' 73
165. See generally Lewis A. Silverman, Suffer the Little Children: Justifying Same-Sex
Marriagefrom the Perspective of a Child ofthe Union, 102 W. VA. L. REv. 411 (1999) (describing
the importance of the institution in American culture and enumerating the many benefits of
marriage).
166. See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 64 (2000) ("The nationwide enactment of
nonparental visitation statutes is assuredly due, in some part, to the States' recognition of these
changing realities of the American family."); see discussion infra Part II.D.2.
167. See Forman, supra note 9, at 44; Williams, supra note 15, at 420 (noting that the best
interests of children require legislative recognition of same-sex relationships "so that children and
parents in today's society can all receive the same rights and be subject to the same obligations of
the parent-child relationship."); see generally Silverman, supra note 165 (noting the importance of
marriage as an institution in American culture and enumerating its many benefits).
168. Forman, supra note 9, at 44.
169. Silverman, supra note 165, at 430.
170. Id.
171. See Bonauto, supra note 57, at 16 (discussing difficulties in applying marital rules,
including divorce remedies, to a non-marital relationship); see also supra notes 57-58 and
accompanying text.
172. See Foreman, supra note 9, at 44-45 (discussing enactment of same-sex marriage and
marriage alternative statutes in several states); Williams, supra note 15, at 437-39 (discussing states'
applications of marital principles to same-sex couples).
173. Connecticut, Iowa, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Vermont. Kerrigan v. Comm'r of
Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 481 (Conn. 2008) (holding that the equal protection provision of the
state constitution prohibited a bar on same-sex couples marrying); Vamrnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d
862, 907 (Iowa 2009) (holding statutory language limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples invalid
and stating that the statute had to be interpreted to allow for same-sex marriage); Goodridge v.
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However, several states offer alternatives to marriage to same-sex
partners, such as domestic partnerships or civil unions.174 The extent to
which these alternative institutions grant the rights and obligations of
marriage varies according to jurisdiction.'7 5 None of the alternative
institutions confer benefits and duties that are coextensive with those of
marriage, with the exception New Jersey's civil union. 7 6 Therefore, they

Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 969 (Mass. 2003) ("We declare that barring an individual
from the protections, benefits, and obligations of civil marriage solely because that person would
marry a person of the same sex violates the Massachusetts Constitution."); H.R. 436-FN-Local,
2009 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.H. 2009) (bill providing for same-sex marriage and conversion of civil
unions into marriage and going into effect January 1, 2011); Daniela Altimari, State Supreme Court
Legalizes Same-Sex Marriage,HARTFORD COURANT, Oct. 11, 2008, http://www.courant.com/news/
connecticut/hc-gaymarriagel011.artoctl 1,0,1 107488.story (describing Connecticut high court ruling
allowing same-sex marriage); NAT'L GAY & LESBIAN TASK FORCE, RELATIONSHIP RECOGNITION

FOR SAME-SEX COUPLES IN THE U.S. 1 (2009), http://www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/
reports/issue-maps/relrecog_1l 4 09 color.pdf [hereinafter RELATIONSHIP RECOGNITION] (visual
representation of relationship recognition in the United States indicating "full marriage equality" in
Connecticut, Iowa, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Vermont). See generally Bonauto, supra
note 57 (contextualizing Goodridge and updating on events following the ruling).
174. CAL. FAM. CODE § 297 (West 2004) (establishing domestic partnership between "two
adults who have chosen to share one another's lives in an intimate and committed relationship of
mutual caring"); D.C. CODE § 32-702 (2001) (domestic partnerships must be registered before the
mayor in order to qualify for benefits); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 572C-1 to -7 (2006) (reciprocal
beneficiaries with limited rights); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2710 (Supp. 2008) (allowing for
registry of domestic partnership); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 6-101 (West 2009) (defining
domestic partnership); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 457-A: I to A:8 (Supp. 2008) (defining eligibility
for and rights associated with civil unions); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:8A-2 (West 2007) (defining
domestic partnerships with limited rights); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 37:1-28 to -36 (West Supp. 2009)
(civil union with coextensive rights); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 26.60.010-.901 (West Supp. 2009)
(defining domestic partnership with most rights); Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 215, 224 (N.J.
2006) (holding that the Domestic Partnership Act "failed to bridge the inequality gap between
committed same-sex couples and married opposite-sex couples," but leaving to legislature whether
or not to change the definition of marriage); RELATIONSHIP RECOGNITION, supranote 173, at 1.
175.

See RELATIONSHIP RECOGNITION, supra note 173, at 1.

176. Only civil unions available in New Jersey create the same rights and obligations as
marriage. Compare N.J. STAT. ANN. §37:1-31 (West Supp. 2009) (defining civil union with
coextensive rights), and Lewis, 908 A.2d at 224 (holding equal protection requires either same-sex
marriage or an institution with coextensive rights), with CAL. FAM. CODE §297.5 (West Supp.
2009) (granting most rights to domestic partnerships), D.C. CODE § 32-702 (2001) (domestic
partnership with limited rights), HAW. REV. STAT. § 572C-6 (2006) (reciprocal beneficiaries with
limited rights), ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22. § 2710 (Supp. 2008) (allowing for registry of domestic
partnership), MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. §6-101 (West Supp. 2009) (defining domestic
partnership), N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 457-A:6 (Supp. 2008) (defining rights associated with civil
unions), WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 26.60.070-.080 (West Supp. 2008) (defining rights associated
with domestic partnerships), B. 16-52 (D.C. 2005) (purpose of bill is to "grant domestic partners
similar rights and responsibilities currently held by spousal couples in the areas of spousal
immunity, inheritance, surviving spouses and children, spousal support, and public assistance"), and
H.R. 2839, 75th Legis. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2009) (enacted bill amending laws to include
domestic partnership with most rights).
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may fail to protect the coparent-child relationship as fully as marriage. 7 7
Moreover, the alternative institutions remain nonetheless separate from
marriage, and are inherently unequal even where accorded the same
rights and obligations as marriage.17 8 Yet, marriage and similar
institutions remain widely unavailable to same-sex couples,179 as most
states "refuse to recognize the validity of the bond between" these
individuals and the legitimacy of their families.' 80 While "separate but
equal" is unacceptable in terms of race,18 it is permitted in terms of
sexual orientation. 82
Furthermore, the Defense of Marriage Act ("DOMA") aids the
refusal of states and the federal government to legally recognize the
legitimacy of the commitment of same-sex couples to each other and
their families.183 DOMA prohibits the federal government from
recognizing same-sex marriage and its alternatives, and suspends the
Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution' 84 by permitting states to
refuse to recognize out-of-state same-sex marriages, civil unions, and
domestic partnerships.'8 5 Thus, a married coparent is at a high risk of
losing parental status if the family or a member of the family relocates to

177. Silverman, supranote 165, at 456.
178. See Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948 (Mass. 2003) (implicating
that denying marriage to same-sex couples creates "second-class citizens"); Williams, supra note
15, at 438-39 (discussing Goodridge); see also Silverman, supra note 165, at 453-57 (discussing the
inadequacies of alternatives to marriage).
179. See RELATIONSHIP RECOGNITION, supra note 173 (indicating that the majority of states do
not recognize same-sex relationships).
180. Williams, supranote 15, at 439.
181. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
182. See Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 958, 958 n.16 (analogizing the denial of same-sex marriage
to the denial of interracial marriage and discussing "the 'separate but equal' doctrine").
183. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006) (defining marriage as a union between a man and woman); 28 U.S.C.
§ 1738C (2006) (declaring that states are not required to recognize same-sex marriages performed
pursuant to laws of other states); Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, §§ 2, 3, 110 Stat.
2419 (1996); see Williams, supra note 15, at 439-40 (discussing DOMA). But see In re Golinski,
587 F.3d 901, 904 (9th Cir. 2009) (construing DOMA to allow federal insurance benefits to samesex spouses to avoid unconstitutionality); In re Levenson, 560 F.3d 1145, 1151 (9th Cir. 2009)
(holding DOMA unconstitutional if it bars federal insurance benefits); Williams, supra note 15, at
439-41 (discussing DOMA); see also Posting of Andrew Koppelman to Balkinization,
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2009/02/kozinski-and-reinhardt-on-doma.html (Feb. 15, 2009, 10:39
EST) ("[T]wo prominent Ninth Circuit judges . .. declared that DOMA does not preclude the
extension of federal insurance benefits to the same-sex spouses of court employees.").
184. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § I ("Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the
public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State.").
185. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (defining marriage as a union between a man and woman); 28 U.S.C.
§ 1738C (declaring that states are not required to recognize same-sex marriages performed pursuant
to laws of other states); Defense of Marriage Act §§ 2, 3; see Williams, supra note 15, at 439-40
(discussing DOMA).
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a different state.s While some scholars advocate for the legalization of
same-sex marriage in all fifty states to solve this problem, 187 DOMA
would still prohibit the federal government from recognizing these statesanctioned relationships. 8 8
Additionally, marriage is not the decisive solution because not all
same-sex coparents will choose to marry. 18 9 Some same-sex couples
may conceptually prefer private ordering, such as coparenting
agreements,190 over public mechanisms like marriage. 19' Simply put,
some couples may elect not to organize their rights based on legal
models of the nuclear family, which do not properly fit their identities.' 92
Also, some couples may feel that the state's approval of their intimate
relationship through marriage is unnecessary and even antithetical to
their beliefs.193 Finally, other couples may opt not to marry in an effort
to avoid further marginalizing unmarried same-sex couples.19 4 However,
without same-sex marriage or a similar statutory relationship, a
coparent's standing to bring a lawsuit concerning his or her parental
rights and obligations with regards to his or her unadopted child depends
on either the equitable principles discussed above or statutes awarding
standing to so-called third parties.19 5
2. Third Party Statutes
Second, some legislatures have amended state statutes to award
standing to nonlegal parents to better suit the changing composition of
families.1 9 6 These "third party statutes" give standing to parties other
186. Only New York and Washington, D.C. recognize the validity of an out-of-state same-sex
marriage. D.C. CODE § 46-405.01 (2009); see, e.g., Beth R. v. Donna M., 853 N.Y.S.2d 501, 506
(Sup. Ct. 2008) (holding out-of-state same-sex marriages are properly recognized under New York
law); RELATIONSHIP RECOGNITION, supra note 173 (noting that New York and Washington, D.C.
recognize same-sex marriages of other states).
187. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 15, at 439 (taking the position that same-sex marriage and
other institutions are the best and only solution to the problems faced by same-sex couples).
188. 1 U.S.C. § 7 ("In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress...,the word
'marriage' means only a legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife. .. .").
189. See Christensen, supra note 5, at 1318-20 (discussing why same-sex couples may elect to
forgo marriage).
190. See, e.g., Osborne, supra note 7, at 370-71; see supraPart II.B.
191. Christensen, supra note 5, at 1318, 1320-21.
192. Id at 1318-19.
193. Id at 1319-20.
194. Id at 1320.
195. Polikoff, supra note 8, at 508 (describing a third party as a coparent who is "forced into
the legal status of nonparent . .. in custody or visitation disputes").
196. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 64 (2000) ("The nationwide enactment of
nonparental visitation statutes is assuredly due, in some part, to the States' recognition of these
changing realities of the American family."); Polikoff, supra note 8, at 486 (describing an Oregon
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than the legal parent to bring suit for custody or visitation.' 97 There are a
variety of tests to determine which individuals should be awarded
standing under a third party statute.198 For example, some statutes mimic
the equitable tests for parenthood,1 99 while others entitle the court to use
its discretion in determining who is a statutory parent.20 0
However, the Supreme Court made clear that this award of standing
does not constitute permission to a court to override a fit legal parent's
decisions regarding the best interests of his or her children. 2 0 1 In Troxel
v. Granville, the Court tempered Washington's interpretation of its
nonparental visitation statute in order to respect the "fundamental right"
of the legal parent to control the upbringing of his or her children.202 The
statute gave standing to "[a]ny person" to petition for visitation rights "at
any time," and authorized courts to grant visitation when it was in the
child's best interests.20 3 The Court found that the statute in this instance
infringed upon the parent's fundamental right because the state court
could "disregard and overturn any decision by a fit custodial parent
concerning visitation whenever a third party affected by the decision
files a visitation petition, based solely on the judge's determination of
the child's best interests." 20 4 Rather, the Court decided that the fit legal
statute as "one of the most well-developed understandings of parental relationships formed absent
biological ties or legal adoption").
197. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-415(A)(1) (2007) (giving standing to a person who
stands in loco parentis); COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-123(l)(c) (West 2005) (giving standing to
anyone who had "physical care" of the child for more than six months); N.J. STAT. ANN. §9:2-13(f)
(West 2002) (giving the court discretion to define parent by the context of the case, thus including
domestic partners); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 102.003(a)(9) (Vernon 2008) (implicating standing to a
de facto parent); see also V.C. v. M.J.B, 748 A.2d 539, 548 (N.J. 2000) (discussing the New Jersey
statute addressing standing for custody issues, noting that "it is hard to imagine what [the
Legislature] could have had in mind in adding the 'context' language other than a situation ... in
which a person not related to a child by blood or adoption has stood in a parental role vis-a-vis the
child").
198. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 99 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
199. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §25-415(A)(1) (2007) (giving standing to a person in loco
parentis); COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-123(l)(c) (West 2005) (allowing someone who had "physical
care" of the child for more than six months to have standing); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 102.003(a)(9) (Vernon 2008) (implicating that a de facto parent has standing); In re E.L.M.C., 100
P.3d 546, 555 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004) (interpreting third party statute to give standing to
psychological parent); see supra Part II.C.
200. N.J. STAT. ANN. §9:2-13(f) (West 2002) (giving court discretion to define parent by the
context of the case, thus including domestic partners); V. C., 748 A.2d at 547 (holding the language
of the statute "evinces a legislative intent to leave open the possibility that individuals other than
natural or adoptive parents may qualify as 'parents,' depending on the circumstances").
201. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 72-73; see also Velte, supranote 15, at 287 (discussing Troxel).
202. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 68; see WASH. REV. CODE §26.10.160(3) (West 2005).
203. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.10.160(3).
204. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 67.
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parent's decisions merited "special weight." 2 05 Therefore, while a third
party statute can award a nonlegal coparent standing, the legal parent's
decisions regarding their child will be accorded "special weight," even if
those decisions are contrary to the court's best interests analysis.2 06
While third party statutes evidence legislatures' effort to recognize
and accommodate the changing structure of family,20 7 the statutory
amendments have flaws. 20 8 For example, even though legislation can
offer more "consistency, uniformity and predictability" than equitable
solutions,209 those benefits are confined to a particular state as family
law is a subject of state control. 2 10 This patchwork of state law engenders
uncertainty and confusion.21 1
Additionally, even the most liberal statutes may present unworkable
burdens of proof.2 12 For example, the Minnesota third party statute
mandated that the court grant a visitation petition when, in addition to
another requirement, the petitioner proved that the visitation would not
interfere with the child's relationship with his or her legal parent.2 13 The
petitioner in Kulla v. McNulty argued that the burden gave the legal
parents "a virtual veto power by simply testifying that the parties are in
conflict," and that her evidence would be speculative since only the legal
parents possessed "evidence of [the legal parents'] relationship" with the
child.214 The court noted that the burden is difficult "and, perhaps,
rightly so," but rejected that the focus of the third factor is conflict.2 15
Instead, the court circularly explained that the factor required the
coparent to show that the visitation rights would not interfere with the
legal parent-child relationship, simply quoting the language of the
statute.216

205. Id. at 70.
206. See id. at 69.
207. See id. at 64 ("The nationwide enactment of nonparental visitation statutes is assuredly
due, in some part, to the States' recognition of these changing realities of the American family.").
208. See Velte, supra note 15, at 306 (enumerating the problems with legislation).
209. Id. at 305.
210. Id. at 305-06.
211. See id at306.
212. See, e.g., Kulla v. McNulty, 472 N.W.2d 175, 182 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (affirming
failure to meet stringent burden of proof under statute, and explaining that public policy favored the
burden as "fostering the development and harmony of a family unit").
213. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257C.08(2) (West 2007).
214. 472 N.W.2dat 181.
215. Id.
216. Compare MINN. STAT. ANN § 257C.08(4)(3) (requiring movant to prove "visitation rights
would not interfere with the relationship between the custodial parent and the child"), with Kulla,
472 N.W.2d at 181 (noting the prong requires the movant "to show that the 'visitation rights would
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Then, the court rejected the coparent's prima facie evidence of a
psychologist's report, which the doctor made after both observing the
coparent interact with the child and interviewing the coparent. The court
concluded that the doctor "was without a basis on which to form an
opinion as to whether visitation .. . would interfere with the child-parent
relationship in any way" because the doctor did not observe the
relationship between the legal parents and the child.2 17 Thus, the court
required "non-parental third parties .. . to meet the stringent burden" 218
of the statute without a clear picture of how the burden might be met.219
Finally, while these statutes attempt to enable coparents, they serve
as memorials to society's conceptual prejudices regarding the legitimacy
of same-sex couples and their families; the connection between coparent
and child must be proven, rather than assumed as in opposite-sex
marriages.220 Even where opposite-sex parents are not married, the
jurisprudence shows "that active parenting, rather than marriage between
the child's parents, is an important factor in deciding who will be
deemed a legal parent, and thus whose relationship with the child will be
protected." 22 1 Further, the assumptions and protections offered to
opposite-sex parents are not based on biological connection either.222
The lack of biological connection to a child does not hinder the
presumption that a husband is the father of his wife's child when, for
example, she is artificially inseminated with another man's sperm.223 On
the other hand, biological connection "does not hermetically insulate that
relationship from state intervention."22 4 The case Quilloin v. Walcott

not interfere with the relationship between the custodial parent and the minor child' (quoting
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.022(2b)(3) (West Supp. 1982))).
217. Kulla, 472 N.W.2d at 183.
218. Id. at 182.
219. See id. at 184 (holding that the court must determine that visitation would not interfere
with the parent-child relationship, but not offering any guidance on how that burden is met).
220. See Silverman, supra note 165, at 430 (contrasting the husband's assumed and automatic
paternity when his wife is artificially inseminated or when any child is born during the marriage to
the unprotected status of the same-sex coparent); see also Jacobs,supra note 49, at 350-51 (arguing
against limiting coparents to "third party petitioners or 'legal strangers'); Velte, supra note 15, at
273 (arguing that cases involving unmarried fathers are instructive because "they discuss the extent
to which a biological connection is necessary to trigger the constitutional protections of
parenthood"). But see Laura Mansnerus, Baby's Birth Certificate to List Names ofBoth Lesbian
Parents, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2006, at B3 (describing ruling that domestic partners were allowed
to put both names on the birth certificate of their child, circumventing adoption, and getting the
same presumption of paternity afforded to opposite-sex married couples).
221. Velte, supranote 15, at 274.
222. Id. at 275.
223. Silverman, supra note 165, at 430.
224. Velte, supra note IS, at 274.
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stands for the proposition that "biology alone is not determinative of
legal parenthood." 22 5 There, a biological father who was uninvolved in
his child's life was prevented from contesting the adoption of the child
by the stepfather who married the mother after the child was born. 226
However, similar relationships between coparents and their children,
which lack biological connection and are foreclosed from the protections
of marriage, are not as easily recognized despite the abundance of
caretaking and emotional connection.22 7 By relegating coparents to third
party status, courts and legislatures ignore actual and established
parenting relationships that they have not ignored in heterosexual
parenting couples. But, "coparents are anything but third parties-they
are involved, nurturing, loving, and supportive parents."228
III. THE RIGHTS OF COPARENTS

IN NEW

YORK

The law of New York State, while allowing for some important
recognition of coparents, falls short of serving the best interests of the
children of nontraditional families. New York has certainly improved
some of its family law to better suit the changing and dynamic needs of
the modem family. For example, coparents in New York are no longer
mere legal strangers 229 because second parent adoption 23 0 and certain
equitable doctrineS231 are available to them, and New York recognizes
out-of-state same-sex marriages.2 32 However, these advances do not
accord adequate protection to the coparent-child relationship.233 The
following sections will explore the past and present status of New York
law.

225. Id. at 273; see Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 256 (1977).
226. Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 247.
227. See, e.g., Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27, 28 (N.Y. 1991) (refusing to
acknowledge parentage despite emotional bond and caretaking role).
228. Jacobs, supra note 49, at 350.
229. See infra Part III.A.
230. See, e.g., In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d 397, 398 (N.Y. 1995); see infra Part III.B.1.
231. See, e.g., Debra H. v. Janice R., No. 106569/08, 2008 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 6367, at *28
(Sup. Ct. Oct. 2, 2008) (holding legal parent potentially equitably estopped and using in loco
parentis doctrine);see infra Part III.B.3-5.
232. Beth R. v. Donna M., 853 N.Y.S.2d 501, 506 (Sup. Ct. 2008).
233. See, e.g., N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 70 (McKinney 1999) (stating that either parent may
bring a custody action without defining who is a parent); Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d. 1, 12
(N.Y. 2006) (holding that the Domestic Relations Law's limitation of marriage to opposite-sex
couples is not unconstitutional); Janis C. v. Christine T., 742 N.Y.S.2d 381, 383 (App. Div. 2002),
appeal dismissed, 784 N.E.2d 74 (N.Y. 2002) (foreclosing use of doctrine of de facto parenthood);
Bowe, supra note 11 (noting that coparenting agreements are not determinative); see infra Parts
III.B.2-3, 6-7.
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A. The History of the Law in New York
In the past, New York considered coparents to be legal strangers
despite their acknowledged de facto parenthood.234 This principle was
the product of earlier jurisprudence, exemplified in Ronald FF.v. Cindy
GG., where the court maintained that the state "may not interfere with
that fundamental right [of a parent to control his or her child's
associations] unless it shows some compelling State purpose which
furthers the child's best interests."235 It had been long established that
"as between a parent and a third person, parental custody of a child may
not be displaced absent grievous cause or necessity." 236 Therefore,
judicial intervention in the parent's custody was only justified by a
"finding of surrender, abandonment, unfitness, persistent neglect,
unfortunate or involuntary extended disruption of custody, or other
equivalent but rare extraordinary circumstances which would drastically
affect the welfare of the child." 23 7 Simply put, the legal parent's
decisions would not be superseded by a court unless there were
extenuating circumstances that were particularly harmful to the child.238
Applying these principles to same-sex coparents, the New York
Court of Appeals in Alison D. v. Virginia M held the coparent was a
"third person" who did not have standing absent a showing of parental
unfitness. 2 3 9 The court "decline[d]" the coparent's "invitation to read the
term parent in section 70 [of the New York Domestic Relations Law] to
include categories of nonparents who have developed a relationship with
a child or who have had prior relationships with a child's parents and
who wish to continue visitation with the child." 2 40 The court found that
"although petitioner apparently nurtured a close and loving relationship
with the child, she [was] not a parent within the meaning of Domestic
Relations Law § 70."241 The court stated that the fit legal parent had "the
right to the care and custody of [his or her] child, even in situations
where the nonparent has exercised some control over the child with the
234. See Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27, 28 (N.Y. 1991) (refusing to acknowledge
parentage despite emotional bond and caretaking role); see also Jacobs, supra note 49, at 342
("[O]ur laws have not caught up with societal reality. Many lesbian couples are having children; but
courts consider a child born to both a biological lesbian mother and a nonbiological lesbian
mother ... to have one legal parent and one legal stranger." (citation omitted)).
235. 511 N.E.2d 75, 77 (N.Y. 1987).
236. Id.
237. Id (quoting Bennett v. Jeffreys, 356 N.E.2d 277, 283 (N.Y. 1976)).
238. See RonaldFF., 511 N.E.2d at 77.
239. Alison D., 572 N.E.2d at 29; see Franklin,supra note 15, at 716 (discussing Alison D.).
240. Alison D., 572 N.E.2d at 29.
241. Id. at 28.
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[parent's] consent." 24 2 Also, the court reasoned that awarding even a
limited custody to a third party "would necessarily impair the [parent's]
right to custody and control." 24 3 Therefore, because the coparent
conceded that the legal parent was fit, the coparent did not have standing
to ask the court to interject itself into the decision-making of the legal
24424
24 5
parent. This case has never been overruled.
Moreover, the burden of proving the legal parent unfit has remained
246
quite high. For example, in Burghdurf v. Rogers an appellate court
held that "the disruption of a psychological bond between a child and his
or her nonparental caregiver does not rise to the level of extraordinary
circumstances."247 Therefore, in New York, a coparent could not gain
standing by merely pointing to the harm to the child that arose from the
disruption of his or her relationship with the coparent. 24 8 There must be
some additional showing of parental unfitness.249
B. PresentNew York Law
Currently, New York offers more protection to coparents than in
the past. Namely, New York allows second-parent adoption and some
equitable estoppel arguments combined with in loco parentis
determinations.250 The state also recognizes out-of-state same-sex
marriages, 25 1 and New York City offers a limited domestic
partnership.252 On the other hand, New York fails to meet the needs of
nontraditional families by according coparenting agreements little to no
254
253
weight,253 refusing to permit a de facto parenthood determination,
242. Id. at 29.
243.
244.

Id.
Id.

245. A search for overruling decisions yielded no results.
246. See Ronald FF. v. Cindy GG., 511 N.E.2d 75, 77 (N.Y. 1987).
247. 650 N.Y.S.2d 348, 350 (App. Div. 1996). In this case, a grandmother petitioned for
custody of her grandchild, but the principle can easily be applied to a coparenting situation. See id
at 349.
248. See id. at 350 (disruption of psychological bond between child and nonparental caregiver
does not constitute extraordinary circumstances so as to justify displacing parental custody).
249. Id.
250. See, e.g., Debra H. v. Janice R., No. 106569/08, 2008 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 6367, at *28
(Sup. Ct. Oct. 2, 2008) (holding legal parent potentially equitably estopped and using in loco
parentis doctrine); In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d 397, 398 (N.Y. 1995) (allowing for second-parent
adoption).
251. Beth R. v. Donna M., 853 N.Y.S.2d 501, 506 (Sup. Ct. 2008).
252. N.Y. CITY ADMIN. CODE § 3-240 (Supp. 2009).
253. See, e.g., Bowe, supra note 11.
254. Janis C. v. Christine T., 742 N.Y.S.2d 381, 383 (App. Div. 2002), appeal dismissed, 784
N.E.2d 74 (N.Y. 2002).
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excluding same-sex couples from marrying,25 5 and maintaining that a
coparent is not a parent under relevant state law. 25 6
1. Second-Parent Adoption
First, second-parent adoption is available in New York.257
However, the legislature did not institute second-parent adoption, but
rather the Court of Appeals interpreted the traditional adoption statute to
allow for this untraditional form. 2 5 8 In In re Jacob, the court read
Domestic Relations Law section 117 as "a shield to protect new adoptive
families," which was "never intended as a sword to prohibit otherwise
beneficial intrafamily adoptions by second parents." 2 59 The court argued
that a limited reading of section 117 would be irreconcilable with the
legislative intent of promoting beneficial adoptions. 260 Thus, the statute
did "not invariably require termination in the situation where the
biological parent, having consented to the adoption, has agreed to retain
parental rights and to raise the child together with the second parent." 2 6 1
The court concluded that this interpretation avoided "injustice, hardship,
constitutional doubts [and] other objectionable results."262
2. Coparenting Agreements
Second, it is unlikely that coparenting agreements will be afforded
much weight in New York: "At best, co-parenting agreements serve as a
way to establish intent, which state courts can choose to factor into their
decisions-or not. Charged, above all, with looking out for the best
interest of the child, judges are free to ignore even the most well-drawn
documents. ,,263 For example, the court in Alison D. v. Virginia M
completely ignored the private visitation agreement between the legal

255. Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 12 (2008).
256. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 70 (McKinney 1999) (stating that either parent may bring a
custody action without defining who is a parent).
257. In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d 397, 405-06 (N.Y. 1995); see also Forman, supra note 9, at 44
(explaining that New York is an exception because it "allows same-sex, second-parent adoption, but
does not otherwise recognize partners as parents").
258. In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d at 405-06.
259. Id at 405.
260. Id
261. Id. at 404.
262. Id. at 405 (quoting H. Kauffman & Sons Saddlery Co. v. Miller, 80 N.E.2d 322, 325
(N.Y. 1948)).
263. Bowe, supra note 11 (noting that coparenting agreements, "even when drawn up by a
lawyer-often carry little legal weight").
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parent and the coparent. 26 More recently, in a case discussed in depth
below, 26 5 the Supreme Court referred to a stipulation between coparents
that set a specific visitation schedule in its recitation of the facts.266 Even
though the court later found in the nonlegal parent's favor, the court
ordered "a conference to address the custodial issues" without
mentioning the stipulation again.267 So, while a coparenting agreement
may stand as evidence of the intent of the parties, it is unlikely to greatly
influence the court.
3. De Facto Parenthood and Equitable Estoppel
Third, the doctrine of de facto parenthood, used in combination
268
with equitable estoppel, is currently foreclosed to coparents. In 2000,
J.C. v. C.T. enabled a coparent to seek standing by proving de facto
parenthood, which in turn enabled the coparent to petition for visitation
under a theory of equitable estoppel. 2 69 Unfortunately, this case was
overruled on appeal. 2 70 The appellate court summarily held that "[a]ny
extension of visitation rights to a same sex domestic partner who claims
to be a 'parent by estoppel,' 'de facto parent,' or 'psychological parent'
must come from the New York State Legislature or the Court of
Appeals.'271 Even though equitable estoppel had been used "as a defense
in various proceedings involving paternity, custody, and visitation," the
272
court held it did not apply in this case.
4. Equitable Estoppel
Fourth, while de facto parenthood has not been formally revived in
the New York judicial system, coparents have successfully used
arguments of equitable estoppel to convince courts to examine their
rights to custody and visitation.273 First, the Court of Appeals upheld the

264. 572 N.E.2d 27, 28 (N.Y. 1991); see Christensen, supra note 5, at 1353 (discussing
coparenting agreement in Alison D.).
265. Beth R. v. Donna M., 853 N.Y.S.2d 501, 504 (Sup. Ct. 2008); see infra notes 279-85 and
accompanying text (discussing Beth R.).
266. Beth R., 853 N.Y.S.2d at 504.
267. Id at 509.
268. Janis C. v. Christine T., 742 N.Y.S.2d 381, 383 (App. Div. 2002), appeal dismissed, 784
N.E.2d 74 (N.Y. 2002).
269. 711 N.Y.S.2d 295, 299 (Fam. Ct. 2000).
270. JanisC., 742 N.Y.S.2d at 382.
271. Id at 383.
272. Id.
273. See Debra H. v. Janice R., No. 106569/08, 2008 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 6367, at *28 (Sup. Ct.
Oct. 2, 2008) (holding legal parent potentially equitably estopped); Beth R. v. Donna M., 853
N.Y.S.2d 501, 508-09 (Sup. Ct. 2008) (holding legal parent equitably estopped).
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use of the doctrine in paternity disputes because it furthered the best
interests of the child:
The potential damage to a child's psyche caused by suddenly ending
established parental support need only be stated to be appreciated.
Cutting off that support, whether emotional or financial, may leave the
child in a worse position than if that support had never been
given.... [T]he issue does not involve the equities between the two
adults; the case turns exclusively on the best interests of the child.274
In coming to this conclusion, the Court of Appeals noted that New York
courts have "long applied the doctrine of estoppel in paternity and
support proceedings" to promote the best interests of the child. 27 5 For
example, in Jean Maby the court found that it was "inconsistent to estop
a nonbiological father from disclaiming paternity," yet preclude him
"from invoking the doctrine ... in order to continue a long-standing
relationship with the child." 2 7 6 While the court felt constrained by the
holding of Alison D., which held that the coparent was not a statutory
parent, it nevertheless decided that the blind application of that principle
would not be in the best interests of the child.277 Thus, the court departed
from the strict application of the Alison D. principle.27 8
Building on this line of cases, Beth R. v. Donna M held that a
same-sex coparent could invoke the doctrine of equitable estoppel to be
found a "parent." 2 7 9 The court reasoned, "[i]f the concern of both the
legislature and the Court of Appeals is what is in the child's best interest,
a formulaic approach to finding that a 'parent' can only mean a biologic
or adoptive parent may not always be appropriate." 2 80 Thus, in the
context of a divorce proceeding,28 1 the court granted the coparent's
motion "to determine whether [she had] continuing custodial rights and
support obligations." 282 The court noted the following facts warranted its
conclusion:

274. Shondel J. v. Mark D., 853 N.E.2d 610, 615-16 (N.Y. 2006).
275. Id. at 613 (citing Jean Maby H. v. Joseph H., 676 N.Y.S.2d 677, 678 (App. Div. 1998);
see also Beth R., 853 N.Y.S.2d at 507-08 (holding that a "nonbiological parent may offensively
invoke the doctrine of equitable estoppel to preclude a biological parent from cutting off custody or
visitation with a child").
276. Jean Maby H., 676 N.Y.S.2d at 680.
277. Id. at 681-82; see Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27, 29 (N.Y. 1991).
278. See Jean Maby H., 676 N.Y.S.2d at 682; Alison D., 572 N.E.2d at 29.
279. Beth R., 853 N.Y.S.2d at 508-09; see N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 70 (McKinney 1999).
280. Beth R., 853 N.Y.S.2d at 508.
281. The parties had entered into a same-sex marriage in Canada. Id. at 502.
282. Id.
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Although [the legal parent] did not allow the adoption of the children,
[the legal parent] held out [the coparent] to the world, and most
important, to the children, as their parent. The children were given [the
coparent's] last name. The birth announcements presented [the
coparent] as the parent of each child. [The elder child] was encouraged
to call [the coparent] "mom" and [the coparent's] relatives by familial
titles. The extended families of each party were encouraged to treat
[the coparent] as a parent. [The legal parent] held out [the coparent] as
a parent to the children's nanny, doctor and [the elder child's] teachers
and school administrators. [The legal parent] accepted health insurance
and financial contributions from [the coparent] for the benefit of the
children. 283
Also, the court stressed that the parties' marriage was an "additional
factor," noting that a main reason for couples to get married is to create
"familial bonds, . . . particularly for the benefit of their children." 2 84
While this resolution marks a tremendous change in favor of coparents
in that they may use equitable estoppel to prove themselves to be parents
under the relevant state statute, it is important to note that this case is not
infallible. The marriage of the parties was an important factor in the
court's decision, and this could prove to be a significant hurdle, given
the limited availability of same-sex marriage. Additionally, this decision
was issued at the trial court level. The holding has yet to be tested in the

higher courts. 2 8 5
5. In Loco Parentisand Equitable Estoppel
Fifth, shortly after Beth R. v. Donna M.,286 the state trial court
approved the use of an in loco parentis standard to determine whether
the contesting party was entitled to an equitable estoppel argument in the
context of a custody dispute.287 In Debra H. v. Janice R., the court
echoed the concern that "a formulaic approach to defining the word
'parent' . . . may not always effectuate the legislature's express intent of
furthering the best interests of the child,",288 and also sought to be
consistent in application of the estoppel doctrine.289 The court recited the

283. Id. at 509.
284. Id.
285. A search for subsequent history yielded no results.
286. See supra notes 279-85 and accompanying text.
287. Debra H. v. Janice R., No. 106569/08, 2008 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 6367, at *27 (Sup. Ct.
Oct. 2, 2008).
288. Id. at *25.
289. Id.
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facts which, "if found to be true, establish a prima facie basis for
[i]nvoking the doctrine of equitable estoppel": 29 0
Of particular significance are her allegations that the parties moved in
together and consulted an adoption attorney prior to M.R.'s birth, sent
out birth announcements together, were both listed as M.R's parents on
the child-naming certificate and on some of M.R.'s school and camp
documents, and that [the coparent] was present in the delivery room at
M.R.'s birth and cut his umbilical cord, and that M.R. was given [the
coparent's] last name as a middle name on his original birth certificate.
Moreover, the parties' civil union at the time of M.R.'s birth, is a
significant, though not necessarily a determinative, factor in [the]
estoppel argument. 29 1
However, because nearly all of the facts were sharply disputed, a hearing
was necessary to resolve whether the alleged coparent stood "in loco
parentis to the child and may, therefore, invoke the doctrine of equitable
estoppel against" the legal parent.2 92 Therefore, Debra H. v. Janice R.
provides potential standing through an in loco parentisdetermination for
a coparent to assert his or her parental rights through equitable
estoppel.293 However, this decision was also issued from the trial court,
so the reliability of the doctrine remains uncertain. 2 94
6. Same-Sex Marriage
Sixth, New York does not permit same-sex partners to marry.295 In
Hernandez v. Robles, the Court of Appeals held that "the New York
Constitution does not compel recognition of marriages between
members of the same sex" and left the question of whether marriages
should be recognized to the legislature.2 96 First, the court concluded that
the prohibition against same-sex marriage did not violate due process.2 97
The court reasoned that the right to marry someone of the same sex, as
opposed to the right to marry, was not a fundamental right, and therefore

290. Id. at *25-26.
291. Id at *26.
292. Id at *27.
293. See id. at *27-28.
294. A search for subsequent history yielded no results.
295. See Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 12 (N.Y. 2006) (holding "that the Domestic
Relations Law's limitation of marriage to opposite-sex couples is not unconstitutional" and
deferring to legislature).
296. Id. at 5.
297. Id. at 10.
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did not merit a heightened level of scrutiny.2 98 So, the court examined
the restriction on marriage and its benefits to opposite-sex partners with
a "rational legislative decision" standard of review. 2 99 First, the court
found that the legislature "could rationally decide that, for the welfare of
children, it is more important to promote stability, and to avoid
instability, in opposite-sex than in same-sex relationships" because
opposite-sex intercourse leads to children and same-sex intercourse does
not. 300 Also, the court noted that the legislature could find that same-sex
"relationships are all too often casual or temporary." 0 0o Second, the court
explained that the legislature "could rationally believe that it is better,
other things being equal, for children to grow up with both a mother and
a father."3 0 2 To counter this argument, the plaintiffs offered evidence
that proved that there was at least "no marked differences" between
children raised in same-sex households and those raised in opposite-sex
households.3 03 However, the court rejected this offering, explaining that
"[i]n the absence of conclusive scientific evidence, the [1]egislature
could rationally proceed on the commonsense premise that children will
do best with a mother and father in the home."304
Second, the court held that the same-sex marriage prohibition did
not violate the Equal Protection Clause because it did "not create an
irrationally ovemarrow or overbroad classification."3 0 5 First, the court
rejected the argument that the prohibition was overly narrow because
same-sex couples can also have and do have children.3 06 The court
pointed, rather vaguely, to its "earlier discussion [to] demonstrate[] that
the definition of marriage to include only opposite-sex couples is not
irrationally underinclusive." 3 07 Second, the court rejected the contention
that the prohibition was overly broad because marriage is not merely an
institution for bearing children, and many opposite-sex couples choose
not to have children.30 s The court answered that the distinction is not
298. See id.
299. Id at 6; see also Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) ("The
general rule [of rational basis review] is that legislation is presumed to be valid and will be
sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state
interest.").
300. Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 7.
301. Id.
302. Id
303. Id. at 7-8.
304. Id. at 8.
305. Id. at 12.
306. Id. at I1.
307. Id.
308. Id.
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overinclusive because "limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples likely
to have children would require grossly intrusive inquiries, and arbitrary
and unreliable line-drawing."309 In sum, the court found the distinction
between same-sex and opposite-sex couples to be constitutionally sound,
exercising extreme judicial restraint, and stressed that the people of the
state must turn to the legislature to address this issue.31
While New York does not offer the protections of marriage to its
own same-sex couples, New York recognizes out-of-state same-sex
marriages and acknowledges other statutory relationships. 3 11 Governed
by common law and considerations of comity, "New York courts have
long held that out-of-state marriages, if valid where entered will be
respected in New York even if under New York law the marriage would
be void." 3 12 Additionally, state and local executive offices have recently
released statements that support recognition of out-of-state marriages.3 13
Also, New York City provides a limited form of domestic
partnership for city residents or employees. 3 14 However, the domestic
partnership does not offer many substantial benefits to the typical samesex couple. 3 15 Additionally, domestic partnership explicitly excludes the
right to use "equitable estoppel to enforce parental rights," among other
important rights.3 16
309. Id at 11-12.
310. Id. at 12.
311. See, e.g., Debra H. v. Janice R., No. 106569/08, 2008 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 6367, at *26
(Sup. Ct. Oct. 2, 2008) (acknowledging that civil union procured in Vermont, which is "given the
same benefits, protections and responsibilities under Vermont law as are granted to those in a
marriage," is a factor in determination); Beth R. v. Donna M., 853 N.Y.S.2d 501, 506 (Sup. Ct.
2008) (recognizing out-of-state marriages as valid).
312. Beth R., 853 N.Y.S.2d at 504.
313. See id. at 505-06 (listing statements by various state executives).
314. N.Y. CITY ADMIN. CODE § 3-240 (Supp. 2009); see Office of the City Clerk, Domestic
Partnership
Registration,
http://www.cityclerk.nyc.gov/html/marriage/domestic_partnership
reg.shtml (last visited Mar. 25, 2010) (discussing the procedure of obtaining a domestic partnership
in New York City, and the rights and privileges associated with it).
315. See Office of the City Clerk, supra note 314 (explaining that domestic partnership allows
for benefits including a monetary award from the Mayor to the surviving partner following the lineof-duty death of a city employee; health insurance coverage for the domestic partner of a member of
the police or fire departments who was killed in the line of duty; city employee benefits;
qualification as a "family" under the housing code; a special parking permit for the domestic partner
of person with a disability; the right to visit a domestic partner in a health care facility; treatment as
a spouse for the purposes of death benefits for a domestic partner killed in the attacks of September
11, 2001; and other minor and miscellaneous rights).
316. Id. Other excluded rights include the right to "[g]eneral worker's compensation death
benefits," the right to "maintain an action based upon an implied contract for personal services" or
an "action in partition or division of property under legal framework of marriage," the right "to
bring a wrongful death claim," the rights "inherent in marital residence," and the right "to maintain
an action for loss of consortium." Id.
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7. Third Party Statute
Seventh, state custody and visitation statutes do not adequately
enable coparents to assert their parental rights, nor sufficiently hold
coparents to their parental obligations.3 17 As explored above, only a
parent may bring a custody action in New York.318 However, the
relevant law does not define who qualifies as a parent.3 19 As evidenced,
the courts have waivered on whether a coparent is a parent for the
purposes of the statute. 32 0 The most recent trend of case law evidences a
willingness on the part of the judiciary to view a same-sex coparent as a
parent under the statute if the coparent proves that he or she stands in
loco parentis to the child. 321 Even then, however, coparents are forced to
present arguments of equitable estoppel to prevent the legal parents from
contesting their paternity.3 22 Additionally, a coparent cannot truly
depend on a favorable judicial interpretation of his or her role in regard
to the child until the Court of Appeals speaks to this new line of
interpretations. 32 3 Ultimately, the legislature has remained silent on this
issue.324 Without a definition that accommodates finding a coparent to be
a parent, a coparent is forced to bring suit as a third party.325 As a third
party, the coparent must prove parental unfitness before the court can
infringe upon the legal parent's fundamental rights.326 As the burden of
proving parental unfitness is very high, the coparent will not meet it
without proving some sort of serious detriment to the child, which

317. See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 70 (McKinney 1999) (stating that either parent may bring a
custody action without defining who is a parent); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §240 (McKinney 1999)
(structuring the court's determination of child custody and visitation); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 651
(McKinney 2009) (outlining jurisdiction of the state family court to determine custody and
visitation of minors).
318. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 70; see discussionsupra Part III.A.
319. See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 70; see, e.g., In re Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27,
29 (N.Y. 1991).
320. Compare Alison D., 572 N.E.2d at 28 (not a parent), and Janis C. v. Christine T., 742
N.Y.S.2d 381, 383 (App. Div. 2002) (not a parent), with Jean Maby H. v. Joseph H., 676 N.Y.S.2d
677, 679 (App. Div. 1998) (more open interpretation of parent), Debra H. v. Janice R., No.
106569/08, 2008 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 6367, at *28 (Sup. Ct. Oct. 2, 2008) (coparent could stand in
loco parentis),and Beth R. v. Donna M., 853 N.Y.S.2d 501, 508 (Sup. Ct. 2008) (parent).
321. See, e.g., Debra H., 2008 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 6367, at *27-28; see supraPart III.B.5.
322. See, e.g., Debra H., 2008 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS at *27; see supraPart III.B.5.
323. See, e.g., Debra H., 2008 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 6367, at *27-28 (allowing for in loco
parentisdetermination at the trial court level).
324. See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 70 (parent still undefined).
325. See, e.g., Alison D., 572 N.E.2d at 28 (coparent forced to bring suit as a third party
because not a parent under the statute).
326. Ronald FF. v. Cindy GG., 511 N.E.2d 75,77 (N.Y. 1987).
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cannot be met by the termination of the coparent-child relationship
alone.327
IV. THE FUTURE OF THE RIGHTS OF NONTRADITIONAL FAMILIES IN
NEW YORK

In sum, New York State must be tolerant and flexible with the
innumerable variations of family compositions and protect all families
equally in order to faithfully enforce the state policy of placing a child's
welfare before all other concerns in the dissolution of a family. 3 2 8 Unless
New York modifies its current legal and legislative structures, the
relationship between a child of a nontraditional family and his or her
coparent will not be adequately protected, if protected at all. 3 29 Even if
New York shelters nontraditional relationships to a degree, the law as it
stands now does not afford the same protection to a child of a
nontraditional family as the law does to a child of a traditional family. 330
This discrepancy exists because remedies are available to opposite-sex
parents to assert their parental rights that are not always available to
same-sex coparents.33 1 But, then again, through the eyes of an impartial
stranger, such as a judge, a child-coparent relationship may be harder to
distinguish than a relationship between, for example, a child and his or
her biological, involved father. Even more perplexing to such a party
may be the difference between a close, but not parental, relationship
between a child and his or her mother or father's partner. 33 2 In order to
make these determinations while acknowledging and protecting
important nontraditional parenting relationships, each of the above
methods must be available to same-sex coparents, so they can organize

327. See, e.g., Burghdurf v. Rogers, 650 N.Y.S.2d 348, 350 (App. Div. 1996); see supra notes
247-49 and accompanying text.
328. See, e.g., N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 70 (stating that neither parent has a prima facie right to
custody, but that courts will determine custody solely on analysis of best interests of child); Ronald
FF., 511 N.E.2d at 77 (holding state may not interfere with parent-child relationship without
compelling state purpose furthering the child's best interests); Bowe, supra note 11 (stating courts
are charged with protecting the child's best interests above all else).
329. See discussion supra Part III.B (examining the extent of rights of same-sex coparents).
330. See discussionsupra Part III.B.
331. See discussion supra Part III.B (examining remedies for asserting parental rights); see,
e.g., Debra H. v. Janice R., No. 106569/08, 2008 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 6367, at *25 (Sup. Ct. Oct. 2,
2008) ("[I]t is inconsistent to estop a nonbiological father from disclaiming paternity in order to
avoid support obligations, but preclude a nonbiological parent from invoking the doctrine against
the biological parent in order to maintain an established relationship with the child.").
332. See, e.g., Debra H, 2008 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 6367, at *25-27 (stating disputed facts and
requiring an in loco parentisdetermination).
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their lives to protect their families without having to resort to the
uncertainty and expense of the judicial system.
First, the advances the judiciary has made thus far in allowing for
second-parent adoption must continue to be available to nontraditional
families.334 However, the legislature needs to independently and
explicitly approve of second-parent adoption by amending the statute.
Also, the statute should make it unlawful to preclude a coparent from
adopting solely on the basis of the coparents' same-sex relationship.
Both of these objectives could be achieved by simply amending section
I10 of the Domestic Relations Law to include the following language:
If a family unit consists of a parent and the parent's partner, and
adoption is in the best interest of the child, the partner of a parent may
adopt a child of the parent. Termination of the parent's parental rights
is unnecessary in an adoption under this subsection. A same-sex
relationship between the parent and the parent's partner, without more,
is not in contravention of the best interests of the child. 335
These provisions are necessary because the permission of the Court of
Appeals to grant adoption petitions will not affect judges who
categorically question the stability and appropriateness of same-sex
relationships.3 36 Currently, too much is left up to the discretion of
unsympathetic judges. Without legislative mandates, judges are not
obligated to act without prejudice against same-sex couples in granting
adoptions.
Second, the agreements same-sex coparents make to raise a family
or to organize the dissolution of a relationship must be afforded weight
as at least evidence of intent, subject to a best interests analysis. 3 If a
coparenting couple agrees on a visitation schedule after the dissolution
of their relationship, a court should consider the agreement. To ignore
such a schedule, especially if it was followed without dispute for a long
period of time, is to turn a blind eye to the reality of the situation. That
visitation scheme is clear evidence of the parties' mutual intent to share
333. See supra notes 155-60 and accompanying text.
334. See discussion supra Parts IIA, III.B.1.
335. A portion of this language mimics Vermont's second-parent adoption statute. VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 15A, § 1-102(b) (2007).
336. See NAT'L CTR. FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS, ADOPTION BY LESBIAN, GAY, AND BISEXUAL
PARENTS: AN OVERVIEW OF CURRENT LAW 3 (2010), www.nclrights.org/site/DocServer/
adptnO204.pdf?doclD-1221 ("In practice, judicial reaction to openly lesbian, gay, and bisexual
adoptive parents ranges from supportive acceptance to overt hostility.").
337. See discussionsupra Parts II.B, III.B.2.
338. See, e.g., Nancy S. v. Michele G., 279 Cal. Rptr. 212, 214 (Ct. App. 1991) (private
visitation agreement followed for several years without conflict).
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time with the children and to continue raise them together despite the
termination of the relationship; it should be recognized as such.
Specifically, there should be a statutory provision that allows for a
decree stating either the intent of the parties to coparent a child or
organizing a visitation/custody scheme to be filed with the court or other
state agency.3 39 While this decree should not be afforded determinative
weight, it should be available to the parties for purposes of estoppel as
evidence of intent should one of the coparents later deny paternity.340
Allowing coparents to privately organize resolutions to their disputes or
to prevent disputes all together will lighten the burden on the judicial
system and provide nontraditional families with more immediate
security.
Third, the legislature should amend the law to recognize the reality
of the modem family, and define a coparent as a parent vested with full
parental rights. This includes specifically defining a coparent to be a
"parent" in legal parity with a biological parent under section 70 of the
Domestic Relations Law.341 More specifically, the legislature should
adopt a de facto parent test, effectively overruling Janis C. v. Christine
T., and give the courts a defined standard to determine who qualifies as a
parent.34 2 The test enunciated in Holtzman v. Knott is best suited to this
end.343 That de facto determination gives courts a very particular
standard, which will include the great majority of same-sex coparents,
while serving to exclude those individuals who are involved in the
child's life, but not as a parent. 3 4 The specificity of the test will
hopefully ensure consistent results by leaving less up to the discretion of
the court. Whatever standard the legislature chooses to adopt, a
"triggering event" 345 should not be required because it unnecessarily
endangers the child.34 6 If a coparent's relationship with his or her child
must be interrupted before the coparent can assert his or her rights, the
relationship must be compromised before the coparent can take any steps

339. See, e.g., Kristine H. v. Lisa R., 117 P.3d 690, 696 (Cal. 2005) (allowing coparent to estop
legal parent with a filed stipulation regarding intent to coparent).
340. See, e.g., id (estopping the legal parent with a filed stipulation regarding intent to
coparent).
341. See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 70 (McKinney 1999).
342. 742 N.Y.S.2d 381, 383 (App. Div. 2002) (invalidating adoption of de facto parentage
test).
343. 533 N.W.2d 419,421 (Wis. 1995).
344. See id.(outlining the four requirements); see also text accompanying note 88.
345. See id (de facto test requiring "triggering event" in which legal parent substantially
interferes with coparent's relationship with the child).
346. See supra notes 116-21 and accompanying text.
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to protect it. 3 47 Rather, the coparent should be entitled to the same
fundamental rights as a legal parent and the disruption of a child's
relationship with his or her de facto parent should be against his or her
best interests as a matter of law so as to justify interference in the
biological parent-child relationship.34 8
Fourth, courts must be allowed their traditional broad discretion to
apply applicable family law fairly to each individual situation in order to
reach the most just result. This means that the de facto parent,34 9
3 5 doctrines must remain
equitable estoppel, 350 and in loco parentis
available to the courts. The possibilities of variation within individual
families are innumerable, and this variety is only amplified when dealing
with nontraditional family forms. These doctrines are available in the
context of opposite-sex parenting couples, and courts should be
permitted to exercise their traditional discretion in the context of samesex parenting couples as well.352 In fact, it would seem that equitable
discretion is even more appropriate in nontraditional families, whose
form may not have been anticipated by the legislature.353 Judges should
not be criticized for coming to fair resolutions merely because they
depart from the original legislative conception. 354 Judges are constantly
presented with novel situations that must be resolved. Courts must work
with what statutory guidance they have, and come to equitable
resolutions.
Fifth, the New York legislature must institute same-sex marriage
355
that affords the same rights as traditional marriage.
Just as
importantly, New York must continue to give full faith and credit to outof-state same-sex marriages and other statutory relationships. 35 6 The
legislature must take the Court of Appeals' invitation to "listen and
decide as wisely as it can" as to whether same-sex marriage is right or
wrong. 35 7 It is time to abandon the idea that same-sex couples do not
need the protections of marriage because they do not have children as

347.
348.
349.
350.
351.
352.
353.
354.
355.
356.
357.

See supra notes 116-21 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., In re E.L.M.C., 100 P.3d 546, 561 (Colo. App. 2004).
See discussion supra Parts II.C.1, II.B.3.
See discussionsupra Parts II.C.3, III.B.4.
See discussionsupra Parts II.C.2, 1II.B.5.
See discussionsupra Part III.B.4-5.
See supra notes 160-64 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 149-54 and accompanying text.
See discussionsupra Parts II.D.1, III.B.6.
See discussionsupra notes 311-13 and accompanying text.
Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 12 (N.Y. 2006).
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conveniently or as flippantly as same-sex couples.m It is axiomatic that
same-sex couples are having children, questions of convenience aside.
Further, the legislature cannot cling to the bare assertion that children are
better off with a mother-father parenting couple, though the Court of
Appeals does. 3 59 The evidence that demonstrates that there is no
difference between same-sex and opposite-sex parenting couples' ability
to raise children must be acknowledged and accepted. 36 0 Allowing samesex partners to marry and to give their families the best possible
protection by publically proclaiming their lifetime commitment to one
another is right. Relegating same-sex couples to a non-marriage
institution is wrong; there is no such thing as separate but equal.361
Excluding same-sex couples from the protections and benefits of
marriage is harmful discrimination, and the children of these
categorically disadvantaged and unprotected families pay the biggest
costs of all.
V. CONCLUSION

In conclusion, New York currently does not recognize the
legitimacy of coparent-child relationships, or adequately protect the truly
loving, caring, and nurturing environment that they create for so many
fortunate children. On the contrary, New York affords significantly less
protection to a child's relationships in a nontraditional family than the
state does in a traditional family. For example, in a traditional family,
the parents are clearly statutory "parents," entitled to assert their parental
rights in court, coequal with the other parent. Also, in opposite-sex
parenting couples, biology is not determinative of paternity.
Additionally, the parenting couple in a traditional family can marry and
thereby cement the familial bonds and obligations that are meant to
protect children, and qualify for divorce remedies should the adult
relationship end. But these options are either not available or, at best, not
guaranteed to same-sex coparents. Biology becomes determinative, or at
least so heavily weighted that a simple "third party" coparent cannot
overcome the legal parent's autonomy. Thus, the state affords less
protection to the child of a nontraditional relationship than a child of a
traditional relationship purely because his or her parents are a same-sex
358. See id. at 7 (asserting that promoting stability in opposite-sex couples is rational because
opposite-sex intercourse potentially leads to pregnancy, whereas same-sex intercourse does not).
359. See id. (offering the benefit of growing up with a mother and a father as a rational reason
for the legislature to limit marriage to opposite-sex couples).
360. See id at 8 (discussing studies introduced by the plaintiffs).
361. See supra notes 176-82 and accompanying text.
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couple. This unequal treatment cannot be in the best interests of the
child. Disregarding coparent-child relationships does not promote the
best interests of child because deep, meaningful emotional bonds
between a child and his or her coparent can be severed with little to no
recourse. And this is a two-way street: a legal parent can cut off the
coparent from seeing their child or a coparent can renounce his or her
responsibilities as a parent and refuse to support and acknowledge their
child. If we do not let the mothers and fathers of opposite-sex parenting
couples act selfishly at the expense of their children, we cannot let the
mothers and fathers of same-sex parenting couples do so either.
To foster the best interests of a child in a nontraditional family,
each of the above described methods must be available to same-sex
coparents in New York State, so that nontraditional families can tailor
their relationships to reflect their unique situations. Allowing for secondparent adoption is a step in the right direction, but New York cannot stop
there. Adoption is expensive and time-consuming, and it is an additional
step that opposite-sex parenting couples, even where one parent is not
biologically related to the child, often do not have to take because of the
presumption of legitimacy that arises from marriage. Same-sex
coparents should be allowed to privately order their lives, and courts
should take notice of agreements between coparents as evidence of their
intent. Furthermore, there should be a mechanism by which coparents
can file documents with the court or another state agency to evidence
their intent to coparent a child together. These agreements, however,
should not be determinative; the court should always apply a best
interests analysis in its decisions. With that said, courts should be
allowed to apply the same equitable remedies they have always been
able to use, such as equitable estoppel, to coparenting situations.
Standards like de facto parenthood and in loco parentis are merely
attempts by the court to come up with a fair and equitable standard that
will apply to more than one instance, in an effort toward consistency.
This is not judicial activism; this is judicial ingenuity, necessary to solve
the innumerable variation of disputes that come before the court. But,
the answer does not lie completely within the court system; legislatures
must also act. First, same-sex couples must be allowed to marry, and that
marriage must afford them and their families all of the traditional
protections and obligations. After all, if the couples are allowed to
marry, but they are not entitled to divorce remedies, a presumption of
legitimacy, or other marital benefits and responsibilities, this problem
will not be solved. Finally, the legislature must amend the relevant
statutes to explicitly define a coparent as a parent. It is time to
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acknowledge these relationships for what they create: a family. We, as
both a society and as a legal community, must continue to challenge the
outdated, so-called "traditional" nuclear family model to recognize and
protect the reality, diversity, and legitimacy of the modem American
family.
Marissa Wiley*
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